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I. INTRODUCTION
A. THE BURDEN OF KNOWLEDGE

Sometimes we are better off not knowing things. This nearaphorism is unremarkable when understood as an observation about
our everyday lives. Do you really want to know the day, time, and
circumstances of your own death? Do you want to know the details
of your children's (or parents') love lives? Do you want to know
whether your neighbors are scrupulous in paying their taxes? To
these, and many questions like them, we answer almost reflexively,
"I'd rather not know." We are happier, indeed better off by many
measures, if ignorant.
Ignorance prevents us from anticipating the
But why?
consequences of our actions. Knowledge, conversely, is the power to
predict, the power to exploit our position in the world. It would
seem to follow that more knowledge is better.
Despite the advantages knowledge often confers, ignorance is
sometimes preferable because it shields us from unpleasant
realities, keeps us from facing difficult choices, or immunizes us
against attack by others. This Article explores the manifold
interests people have in remaining ignorant and the societal
interests in supporting or denying those interests.
As our society becomes increasingly information-dependent and
information-saturated and as we become better predictors of our
futures, we will be confronted more frequently with the dilemma of
knowledge. With knowledge comes the power to make informed
choices but also the burden of knowing. Knowing one has an
incurable genetic disease may enhance the ability to plan-perhaps
even to mitigate somewhat the ill effects-but may also make less
happy and enriching the time one has left. Knowing that evidence
is false will cause a lawyer to refuse to put the evidence forth or face
the risk of serious sanctions. In situations like these people may
well decide, where possible, not to know.
Conscious ignorance is keeping a secret from one's self. We keep
such secrets for some of the same reasons we keep secrets from
others: because we are afraid of what the person may do with the
information; because we are afraid of what she will not do; because
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we are afraid of what she may think of us, the world around her, or
herself; or only because we are afraid she will tell others.
When we keep secrets from ourselves, we are motivated by these
same concerns. Receiving information may compel one to perform
undesirable conduct, whether that be taking medications,
undergoing surgery, firing an employee, or spending large sums to
clean up contaminated property. Conversely, information can
restrain us from performing desirable conduct, either (a) because
the information reveals that the desired conduct is harmful or (b)
because possession of the information while performing the conduct
will cause others to infer that the conduct was undertaken on
account of the information.'
Besides affecting what activities one performs in the world,
knowledge can alter our self-regard or worldview. Whether it
challenges our deeply held religious or moral beliefs or reveals us as
a different kind of person-perhaps one more vulnerable or less
adaptable to change-than we imagined ourselves, knowledge can
shake our operating framework in unwelcome ways. Maintaining
ignorance is a way the current self can extend itself, avoiding the
realization of a morally and practically distinct future self. In this
sense, ignorance is a form of self-preservation. This is to say
nothing about society's interest in forcing or preventing such private
upheavals, only that these risks are reasons individuals might have
for remaining ignorant.
Finally, it is sometimes impossible to learn something without
permitting others to learn the information as well. Diagnostic tests
require technicians to read, interpret, and store the results.
Investigations often require professional investigators. It is even
the case that we do not always trust ourselves to maintain secrets.
Consequently, there is a risk with obtaining knowledge that the
knowledge will be shared with others. Even if we would not be
harmed directly upon acquiring knowledge, the information could be
very damaging if held by others. The risk of further dissemination
is a reason individuals may have not to acquire the information at
all.
1 This situation applies to conduct such as refusing to hire an applicant whose race was

solicited on an application form.
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In Part II of this Article, I explore these reasons for remaining
ignorant through four examples: HIV testing, genetic testing, the
collection of information concerning race on credit applications, and
lawyers faced with client perjury or false evidence. These examples
are not archetypes that cover the field. Rather, each presents a
different mix of the justifications for ignorance and helps to
elucidate the strength and foundation of those justifications. I treat
these interests systematically in the third Part.
Recognizing that people sometimes strongly wish to remain
ignorant, or would so wish if they had a choice, the question arises
whether law should aid them, frustrate them, or do nothing. In the
fourth Part, I focus on society's reasons and means for using law to
aid ignorance. The rather extraordinary step of preventing the
spread of knowledge to someone who wishes not to have it can be
justified on several grounds.
First, law may protect ignorance in order to give effect to the
individual's own reasons for preferring ignorance.2
In other words, we may recognize a "right not to know" grounded in
respect for an individual's autonomy, though our understanding of
autonomy affects the nature and extent of such "rights."
Second, ignorance might serve the instrumental goals of the
jurisdiction, without regard to the individual's own reasons for
wishing to remain ignorant. A jurisdiction's purely instrumental
interest in maintaining an individual's ignorance may coincide with
an individual's interest either (a) because the individual's interest,
if frustrated, would lead to broad social harms or (b) just by
happenstance. Only the former category is relevant to this Article. 3
For example, if the law does not protect an individual's "right" to
remain ignorant, he or she may be driven away from societal
participation to a degree or in a fashion that the jurisdiction believes
is undesirable for social, rather than paternalistic, reasons. If the
results of HIV tests must be disclosed to those to whom the tests are
administered, then some may not consent to testing that serves
2

Of course, there may also be instrumental reasons for giving effect to individual

desires; the distinction here is not meant to be hermetic.
' Reasons in the latter category, "happenstance," would apply whatever the individual's
knowledge preferences. This Article is concerned with ignorance that serves an individual's
interests.
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broader social goals. Some pregnant women may shun prenatal care
if it necessarily includes such tests. But in addition to being driven
away, a person may respond to learning something in other socially
undesirable ways. Society may wish to prevent these consequences,
even if the individual's own wish to remain ignorant has nothing to
do with the socially undesirable consequences of her knowledge.
Whatever the collective determination on the question of
ignorance, there is an array of regulatory options for meeting or
frustrating an individual's desire to remain ignorant. Law can
intervene or not. It can regulate the third parties that are
intermediaries for suspect information. It can, by imposing
liabilities that might follow from not knowing, shift the risk of
ignorance to the knowledge avoider.
Though we have many tools to affect the distribution of
knowledge in society, the regulation of knowledge as a resource has
to contend with many inherent difficulties. For example, even when
society is willing to aid in the avoidance of knowledge, it may be
practically impossible to do so. Attempting to probe an individual's
true desires might have the effect of conveying some or all of the
suspect information. Thus, it is sometimes necessary to make
choices for individuals either because of the difficulty of ascertaining
their true preferences or because we are distrustful of an
individual's ability to act in his or her best interest.
But most importantly, knowledge regulation must take account
of the key respect in which knowledge differs from traditional forms
of property. Unlike a computer, a hat, or even a ticket to a show,
knowledge cannot be abandoned.4 While it can be fortuitously lost

' Though it is often said that real property cannot be abandoned, 1 AM. JUR. 2D
Abandoned, Lost, and Unclaimed Property§ 5 (2005), that is only true in a legal sense. Any
attempt to abandon the property will be deemed ineffective. Knowledge, though, resists
abandonment as a matter of fact, not law.
Interestingly, however, drugs now exist that can help us forget. See Adam Kolber,
Freedom of Memory Today, 1 NEUROEThICS 145, 146-47 (2008), availableat http://www.sp
ringerlink.com/content/2rxllth758836121/fulltext.pdf (describing amnesia-inducing effects
of propofol and arguing that research into such compounds should not be unduly impeded).
See generally Adam J. Kolber, Therapeutic Forgetting: The Legal and Ethical Implications
of Memory Dampening, 59 VAND. L. REv. 1561 (2006) (examining legal issues surrounding
memory-dampening technology and arguing against broad restrictions). Despite these recent
developments, we are still quite far from the day, if it ever comes, when our brains can be
treated like the readable and writable storage of computing devices.
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through forgetfulness, harmful knowledge, once gained, is not easily
eradicated. Purposeful efforts to forget are doomed to failure. Thus,
if knowledge would be harmful if held, an individual's only realistic
option for avoiding that harm is not to acquire the knowledge in the
first place. If law is to help such an individual, its focus must
obviously be on preventing its initial acquisition, not on
dispossession ex post.
From a consideration of the reasons individuals have for
remaining ignorant and the reasons societies have to respect that
choice, a considerably more complex picture of the "right not to
know" emerges. The law of knowledge, of which this Article
discusses just one piece, is an intricate ordering of social practices.
Just as property law is most helpfully conceived as an assortment
of practices that on the whole describes the legal connections
between people and the resources that exist independent of law,
whether land, manufactured good, or software, the law of knowledge
describes our attempt to order the connections between people and
the thoughts that animate us. These thoughts, like traditional
property, are distributed among the populace. They can be shared,
withheld, and used in beneficent and dangerous ways. This Article
highlights one respect in which knowledge is radically different from
most other kinds of property: it can, regardless of how it is
ultimately used and despite our determined efforts to cast it out,
cause us harm.
B. THE NATURE OF KNOWLEDGE

Knowing is a personal experience. One's store of knowledge is no
more, and no less, than the configuration of certain of the contents
of his or her brain. However, there are differing views as to what
characteristics are necessary to label some cognitive state, or
thought, as "knowledge." Some would require that a thought be
justified, true, and believed. 5 It is highly contested precisely what

' This definition has a long pedigree. See, e.g., PLATO, THEAETETUS 114-15 (Robin A.H.

Waterfield trans., Penguin Books 1987) (examining whether but not concluding that
knowledge is "true belief accompanied by a rational account"); PLATO, MENO 58-59 (Benjamin
Jowett trans., Liberal Arts Press 1949) (describing true opinions as inferior to knowledge for
their fleetingness against the stability of knowledge, which is true opinion "fastened by a
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kind of truth and what kind ofjustifications, whether in the form of
pure logical entailment or mere evidence, are needed to elevate a
mere belief to the special, objective status of knowledge.' Some are
happy not to insist on truth or justification at all.7 These differing
views do not, however, constitute a substantive debate. They merely
describe, using the same label, slightly different things. To the
extent there is a disagreement, it concerns which of these "things"
is worth talking about.
For my purposes, it is sufficient to reflect on the functional
nature of the qualities of those thoughts I am calling knowledge.
The problem that is the subject of this Article is how to handle
situations in which people might gain thoughts they would rather
not have. What kind of thoughts? Not pure desires, though surely
an interesting issue surrounds the tendency of the brain
simultaneously to provoke and to inhibit conduct by fueling our
stores of desire, guilt, and inhibition.
Since my concern is with the effects of thoughts encapsulating
predictive and descriptive facts about the world, particularly the ill
effects, I tend to think of knowledge as a presumed capacity. That
is, knowledge is a quality of the brain that represents what the
holder presumes to be a capacity to act with purpose, to predict, and
to understand sensory information. This description is similar to
another definition of knowledge as a quality that "empowers its
possessors with the capacity for intellectual or physical action,"' but
does not require that this capacity be actual.9
chain" to reason). For an elaboration of the idea and some discussion about the theories of
"truth" upon which the definition depends, see Robert M. Losee, A Discipline Independent
Definitionof Information, 48 J.AM. Soc'Y INFO. Sci. 254, 266 (1997).
" See Edmund L. Gettier, Is JustifiedTrue BeliefKnowledge?, 23 ANALYSIS 121, 121-23
(1963) (raising scenarios in which people are justified in believing something that is actually
not true); Linda Zagzebski, The Inescapabilityof Gettier Problems,44 PHIL. Q. 65, 65 (1994)
(arguing that justified true beliefs are not always knowledge).
7 See, e.g., KENNETH E. BOULDING, THE IMAGE: KNOWLEDGE IN LIFE AND SOcIETY 3-18

(1956) (describing knowledge as organic and subjective, though sometimes shared and
"public").
a Paul A. David & Dominique Foray, Economic Fundamentals of the Knowledge
Society, 1 POL'Y FuTuRES EDUC. 20, 25 (2003).
' This more flexible definition, concerned more with the effects of thoughts than with
their objective validity, is better suited to a study of the social harms concomitant with
information exchange. Likely for that reason, it is used in various guises in other studies of
so-called dangerous knowledge. See Petteri Pietikainen, Truth Hurts: The Sociobiology
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Whether this is a particularly good or complete formulation is
less important than the distinction it draws between knowledge and
information. Information is not a quality of the brain--certainly not
a capacity in and of itself. Rather, information is external to
humans, captured by our sense organs and produced, on those
occasions when we consciously produce it, through our
communicative capacities. We attempt to convey knowledge to
others by encoding that knowledge into communicable information.
When we listen to others, we try to decode the information we hear
into knowledge on which we can later act or predict. 10 Again, it is
not of great importance to me whether there are better descriptions
of "information" or data in the abstract. What does matter for the
issues under consideration here is the observation that knowledge
and information are not identical. 1
After all, the transfer of knowledge from one person to another is
often a far more expensive proposition than simply transmitting
information that encodes the sender's knowledge. Compare the
expense of delivering a copy of a chemistry text to a college student
and the expense of teaching chemistry to that student. Though the
textbook may represent a complete encoding of the knowledge a
professor intends to convey to the student, the information in the
text may not be sufficient to ensure that the student gains the
decoded knowledge the professor wants her to have. And so, the
professor conducts lectures, assigns readings, and administers tests
to present multiple encoded versions of the same knowledge and
multiple opportunities for decoding.
Similarly, if I know how to fix a tire on a bicycle, meaning that I
actually can do it, I might endeavor to encode my knowledge in

Debate, Moral Reading and the Idea of 'Dangerous Knowledge,' 18 Soc.
EPISTEMOLOGY 165, 166-67 (2004) (" 'Knowledge' in this article is not used in its
epistemological sense, but in its pragmatic sense, which means that 'knowledge' refers here
to specific beliefs which are held to be true by specific groups and individuals [and not to be

objective truth].").
10 See Losee, supra note 5, at 260 (describing transmission of knowledge as multi-step
process of encoding, transmitting, and decoding).
" Though my description conceives ofinformation as external signal, whatever its origin,
and knowledge as certain cognitive states, a debate rages as to whether information is a
sensible concept absent human understanding. See, e.g., id. at 255-56, 266-67 (collecting
sources and describing approaches for defining information and knowledge).
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writing and diagrams for the purpose of transmitting my knowledge
to someone else or even to my future, forgetful self. The success of
this transfer depends on both the quality of the encoding and on the
ability of the recipient to translate the information into usable
knowledge. The encoding might have made use of obscure symbols,
assumed familiarity with the use of particular tools, or been
otherwise formulated in a manner that leaves some recipients
puzzled and with no practical knowledge gain. Teaching means
transmitting both information that could be decoded into a capacity
and information that will help socialize the recipient to enable the
decoding.
Deeper philosophical implications and caveats aside, this coarse
distinction between knowledge and information reminds us that a
transfer of knowledge might, depending on the context, require more
than a transfer of information the sender is capable of decoding.
When we consider situations in which people desire ignorance, we
refer to their aversion to some knowledge. Fulfilling their desire
may not necessarily mean restraining the dissemination of the
information that encodes the unwanted knowledge.
There is one more comment on the nature of knowledge worth
making for the purposes of this Article. Unlike some definitions of
knowledge, mine includes objectively false information. Defining
knowledge as thoughts that the holder presumes are a capacity for
action or prediction includes thoughts that in fact do not represent
such a capacity. So, for example, attempts by the German
government to prevent the spread of scientology are, under my
definition, knowledge regulations, even if scientology is bunk. 2 This
is not to sweep under the rug important distinctions between
information that is false and information that is true. If I know the
details of how to construct an atomic bomb, I could, given sufficient
resources, do so and potentially cause harm by using the device. My
knowledge gives rise to a capacity to cause harm. But if, in contrast,
I "know" that my baseball cap can be used, through mental effort

See Germany Moves to Ban Scientology, CNN.CoM, Dec. 7,2007, http'J/edition.cnn.com/
2007/WORLD/europe/12/07/germany.scientology.ap/index.html (reporting efforts in Germany
to ban scientology because German government considers scientology's goals "to be in conflict
with the principles of nation's constitution").
2
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alone, to unleash a death ray, no amount of effort on my part will
convert this "knowledge" to the harm I hoped to cause.
However, it is critical to realize that "false knowledge" can cause
harms, even though such harms may stem from causes other than
the ones the holder anticipated. Believing falsely that one's death,
or that of a loved one, is imminent leads to all of the psychological
trauma and deviations in conduct that an accurate belief would
cause. 1 3 Thus, for the purposes of understanding the harms that
knowledge can cause its holder, we should not ignore "knowledge"
that is objectively false.14
The oracle at Delphi is the source of an excellent example of the
harms false knowledge may cause. According to Herodotus, the
oracle told Croesus that if he launched a war against Persia, he
"would destroy a mighty kingdom." 5 Ultimately, the oracle was
correct.' 6 (Like all great oracles, its pronouncement could be
deemed true in several possible, but radically different, futures.) It
was, however, Croesus' own empire that fell. 7 The information
from the oracle was received by Croesus, and decoded into the
knowledge, which turned out to be false, that his attack would lead
to the downfall of the Persian empire. When we consider knowledge
harms, we must bear in mind that such harms proximately result
not from the objective information itself but from the private,
decoded version of the that information-what I call knowledge.
While information is often easiest to regulate through
dissemination restrictions, affecting the privately decoded
knowledge but permitting the encoded information to pass is also
feasible. For example, additional information may be transmitted
alongside the potentially dangerous information. This metainformation may be calculated to impact the decoding of the

E.g., WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, ROMEO AND JULIET, act 4, sc. 3.
One could contend that I should have entitled this Article "The Burden of Belief" and
avoided describing false cognitive states as knowledge. Indeed, Losee disparages the
subjective view of knowledge as confusing the issue by assimilating knowledge to belief.
Losee, supra note 5, at 267. Perhaps, but I have no desire to develop or adopt an objective
theory of truth for use here. Whatever the label, I am concerned here with the negative
effects on individuals of received information however processed and evaluated.
13

1

is

16

T. DEMPSEY, DELPHIC ORACLE: ITS EARLYHISTORY, INFLUENCE AND FALL 70-71 (2003).

Id. at 71.

17 Id.
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dangerous information so as to render the knowledge gained less
harmful. Indeed, this is the whole point of genetic counseling in
conjunction with predictive genetic testing: preparing the patient
to receive and most beneficially decode vital health information.'"
It is with this regulation-centered understanding of "knowledge"
that we now move to a consideration of unwanted knowledge.
Though society at most can control the information that gives rise
to and amends knowledge, it does so to affect the actions that may
follow from the decoded versions of that information. That is, the
collective is concerned with what individuals ultimately do.
Limiting the flow of information is only a means to an end, not an
end in itself. But because information, unlike knowledge itself, is
susceptible to control and is by definition the stuff of which
knowledge is born, knowledge regulation is achieved through the
regulation of information. With these understandings in mind, I
will turn to the problem of information that is decoded into
undesirable capacities. Such information results in knowledge that
burdens, rather than empowers, its holder.
II. EXAMPLEs OF BURDENSOME KNOWLEDGE
All knowledge, of course, both empowers and constrains to some
extent. Knowing enlarges our set of possibilities but also narrows
it. It can reinforce our beliefs or overturn them. It is, in short, a
chaotic force, one often beyond our control, that sculpts our very
persons as it (a) reduces the world of unlimited options to a
restricted set of rational objectives, dividing conduct into the
rational and the impermissibly irrational, and (b) changes the way
we see ourselves and the world around us. Even when knowledge
is not toxic, meaning that it directly harms us, it might be a
dangerous weapon capable of being turned against us by others.
In this Part, I discuss several examples to illustrate some of the
many situations in which people would rather be ignorant. The
'8

See, e.g., SECRETARY'S ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON GENETICS, HEALTH, AND SOCIETY,

DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., REALIZING THE POTENTIAL OF PHARMACOGENOMICS:

OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES 71(2008), http'//oba.od.nih.gov/oba/SACGHS/reports/SACG
HSPGxreport.pdf (recommending genetic counseling to accompany predictive genetic
testing to ensure understanding).
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examples help to concretize ignorance interests and to suggest
conflicts that law and society have to resolve. My goal in this Part
is not to evaluate the worth of individuals' ignorance interests from
a social perspective, but only to account for them and to describe
them from the perspective of the knowledge holder.
A. GENETIC TESTING
1. Powerand Avoidability. The "right not to know" has received
perhaps its most thoughtful and sustained consideration from
writers in medical ethics, and genetic ethics in particular.
Knowledge of our genetic makeup gives, in principle, the
information necessary to determine how our bodies evolve and
respond to our environment. To be sure, the sheer quantity of
inputs, the diversity of environmental conditions, and the
limitations on our capacity to model and accurately predict the
evolution of complex chemical systems curb our practical ability to
use this genetic knowledge to make precise predictions.1 9 But
technologies so far devised have already enhanced greatly our
abilities to assess an individual's risks of developing certain diseases
and to gauge some of his or her other propensities.2"
Of course, knowledge of this kind is hardly novel. Knowing that
two people are related is a type of genetic datum that doesn't
require one even to know that such a thing as DNA exists. Simple
familial knowledge permits inferences that at least some maladies
that affect one member of a family have a marginally greater chance
than usual of affecting another. For example, we did not need
sophisticated DNA techniques to learn that Huntington's Disease
runs in families.2 1 That one's breeding, independent of upbringing,

19

See Gregorio M. Garcia, The FDA and Regulation of Genetic Tests:

Building

Confidence and Promoting Safety, 48 JURIMETRICS J. 217, 219-20 (2008) (describing

government concerns that began ten years ago regarding the possibility that genetic testing
could be employed before it had ability to accurately predict future inherited diseases).
20 Id. at 217-18 (stating that 1,500 genetic tests are currently available and "[h]ealth and
science communities are abuzz with the promise of personalized medicine and other benefits
offered by genetic testing").
21 See George Huntington, On Chorea, 26 MED. & SURGICAL REP. 317, 317 (1872)

(discussing hereditary chorea and its effect on the nervous system). Huntington's Disease is
an incurable, degenerative disease causing physical, cognitive, and psychological decline. Id.
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influences one's characteristics is an idea, and a potentially quite
dangerous one at that, espoused by Plato:
[Tihe best of either sex should be united with the best as
often, and the inferior with the inferior, as seldom as
possible; and that they should rear the offspring of the
one sort of union, but not the other, if the flock is to be
maintained in first-rate condition.22
Without detouring for any great length into the debate over
whether genetic information is "essential" or radically different from
other kinds of health information, I will observe a couple of reasons
why genetic knowledge is potentially troublesome and one reason
why the option not to know is particularly viable in this context.
First, by examining one's genes directly, we can improve our
estimates of various risks, sometimes approaching certainty and
other times making small improvements over non-genetic
estimates.2"
Whether revolutionary or merely evolutionary,2 4
genetic technology offers the opportunity to predict our futures more
accurately than we have before-and sometimes with blinding
clarity. Thus, it should not be surprising that this form of

Symptoms usually appear during middle age, and death often comes, indirectly, within ten
years of onset. Id. It was described by Dr. George Huntington in an 1872 paper and address,
in which he referred to the disease as hereditary chorea. Id. at 320.
2
PLATO, THE REPUBLIC 126-27 (Benjamin Jowett trans., Dover Publications 2000)
(1894).
' Before genetic assays, those at risk for Huntington's Disease, i.e., those with a parent
diagnosed with Huntington's, lived knowing only that they had a 50% chance of developing
the disease. Amy Harmon, FacingLife with a Lethal Gene, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18,2007, at Al.
Now, the genetic test for Huntington's predicts with near certainty whether an individual will
develop the disease. Id. The tests for genes associated with breast and other cancers also
greatly improve risk estimates. The background, lifetime risk for development of breast
cancer in women is a little over 13%. National Cancer Institute, Genetic Testing for BRCA1
and BRCA2: It's Your Choice, httpJ/www.cancer.gov/cancertopics/factsheetlrisk/brca (last
visited Jan. 9, 2009). For those with altered BRCA1 or BRCA2 genes, the risk is somewhere
between 36% and 85%. Id.
24 I tend to think it the former, especially considered in context alongside advances in
computing and modeling. But see Douglas H. Ginsburg, Genetics and Privacy, 4 TEX. REV. L.
& POL. 17, 23 (1999) (arguing that genetic information does not pose qualitatively different
challenges for law and society than other types of medical information).
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knowledge is as socially combustible as any that serves as an oracle.
With oracles come both power and the potential for madness.2"
Second, even if our genetic data do not define us, they are unique
to us and determine a substantial share of our physiological
functioning. An ephemeral infectious disease we once caught, our
history of accomplishment and conflict, our written work-all these
compose in large, though not exhaustive, measure our histories, but
they are aspects of our cultural personhood. Our genetic data define
our physical personhood, even if our environment and social
relations shape both the expression of that physical personhood and
26
our sensation of it.
Because of the important correspondence between our code and
ourselves, we may be socially marked by that code. We may be
grouped with others based on similarity and separated from still
others by genetic differences. Genetic data as salient characteristics
are potential triggers for discrimination, both invidious and
rational.2 ' And thus our genes can become a source of shame,
disadvantage, or fear.
Third, people actually can, as a practical matter, choose not to
know about their genetic information. It is true, for example, that
people whose family histories place them at risk of disease also may
experience great distress on account of their knowledge of this risk.
However, while learning the health and disease status of one's
parents is an unavoidable incident of most people's lives, the
revelation of detailed genetic information is not a byproduct of day
to day living in any of the world's cultures as now constituted. And
so, these days at least, the question arises whether an individual

2' Ancient mythology is rife with the tragedies that befall individuals after consulting
oracles. The information they receive drives them to behavior that often unwittingly fulfills
the prophecies they hoped to avoid. Robert Klitzman, Genetic Testing CreatesNew Versions
of Ancient Dilemmas, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17, 2006, at F5. As Dr. Robert Klitzman put it: "As
science progresses, as more genes are found, their meaning uncertain, we will be unsure how
to proceed. Much like the ancients, we will get information that we don't want to know and
don't know how to use." Id.
'2 One way to understand genetic data is as computer code. The code is wildly complex
and the range of inputs almost inconceivably great. Thus, predicting the ultimate behavior
of the code from a mere examination of it is fraught with peril. The expression of the code
when run is something more than the code itself-it is the interaction of rules with a sea of
inputs.
'7 See infra notes 49-52 and accompanying text.
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wants or should want to undertake measures to ascertain more
accurately his or her disease risks, whether to consult the oracle or
not.28
The benefits of having more certain knowledge, even if it is grave
and even if there is no opportunity for treatment or mitigation, are
real. For example, one author has suggested the following benefits
from genetic testing for early-onset Alzheimer's where there is a
family history of the disease: (1) elimination of crippling anxiety
caused by uncertainty, (2) increased incentive to engage in
productive planning for the future, (3) increased likelihood of
obtaining counseling, (4) increased chance of participation in clinical
studies that benefit society and the individual, and (5) an enhanced
ability to make reproductive choices.29
But what to one person appears to be the elimination of
uncertainty and an opportunity for planning appears to another as
the death of hope. Writing for the New York Times about whether
she would want to take a hypothetical genetic test for a gene variant
linked to diabetes, Denise Grady wrote, "I'm not sure I want that
straight-up shot of reality. Even with my family history, I figure
there's a chance I got lucky and didn't inherit whatever my mother
had. A test could erode that bit of optimism.""0 The choice whether
to know or not know being pressing, practically available, and
difficult, how does an individual decide what to learn about his own
genetic make-up?
2. Genetic Information That Poses Choices. The results of
predictive genetic testing can have a profound impact on an

' Of course, genetic data are not unique in this respect. Other diagnostic tests may
similarly reveal information an individual would not otherwise receive. The key here is the
ability of the test to reveal something salient about a person's future that is not obvious from
his or her present condition. That is a relatively new capacity of medicine, and genetic testing
perhaps provides the most stark example through which to analyze the problem.
9 Marshall B. Kapp, Physicians' Legal Duties Regarding the Use of Genetic Tests to
Predict and DiagnoseAlzheimer Disease, 21 J. LEGAL MED. 445, 454-55 (2000).
o Denise Grady, Genetic Test for Diabetes May Gauge Risk, but Is the Risk Worth
Knowing?, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 8, 2006, at F5. She concludes:
So what do I want to do? Right now, I'm leaning toward having the test if
it becomes available. I'm not sure what I'd do with the results or whether
they would mean anything for my future. But I'd like the information,
and the right to decide for myself whether to act on it.
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individual's array of rational choices. Our life plans can be
dramatically altered by a test confirming a fatal or totally disabling
disease. One of the most dramatic choices genetic testing now
imposes is the choice a woman has to make whether to undergo a
prophylactic, radical mastectomy when she is found to carry
mutations of the BRCA-1 and BRCA-2 genes. Without the
procedure, she faces a lifetime risk of breast cancer of up to 80%,
compared with a background risk of around 13%.1 Surgical removal
of the breasts reduces this risk by perhaps 90%.32 Faced with these
figures, a woman who carries variants of these genes faces the
agonizing decision whether to undergo a mastectomy, an operation
that, it goes without saying, she desires very much not to undergo.3 3
It should come as no surprise that many women have a difficult
time deciding whether to be tested at all for these variants, even
when they have a family history of breast cancer. In an article for
the New York Times, Dr. Robert Klitzman relays the intra-family
stress caused when one sister wanted this genetic information and
the other, Susan, who already had breast cancer, did not."' The
sister who wanted the information pleaded with Susan, whose
testing would be covered by insurance, to get the test. If Susan's
test were positive, her cancer-free sister would consider a radical
mastectomy. Susan, initially, refused to be tested. Dr. Klitzman
wrote of the sister's desire to know: "I admired this woman's
courage. I realized that I wouldn't want to have to face these
choices myself. She wanted to know her fate. But not everyone
does. Countless patients struggle daily, unsure what to do." 5
Similarly, fetal genetic testing leaves parents to decide which
genetic defects they can live with and which defects will drive them
to abort.3 6 It can be an agonizing decision, and faced with the stark,

3' See supra note 23.
32 Timothy R. Rebbeck et al., BilateralProphylacticMastectomy Reduces Breast Cancer
Risk in BRCA1 and BRCA2 Mutation Carriers: The PROSE Study Group, 22 J. CLINIcAL
ONCOLOGY 1055, 1055 (2004).
'3 Amy Harmon, CancerFree, but Weighing a Mastectomy, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16, 2007,
at Al.
' Klitzman, supra note 25, at F5.
35 id.
' See Lori B. Andrews, PrenatalScreening and the Culture ofMotherhood,47 HASTINGS
L.J. 967, 981 (1996) (describing various impacts on women after learning their fetus has
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but at the same time abstract, reality of raising a disabled child,
would-be parents overcome religious and political convictions to
choose abortion, an action they desperately wish not to take but feel
they must."7 Lori Andrews cites a study in which "two couples who had previously consented to prenatal testing for Huntington's
disease during two pregnancies and had terminated the pregnancies
as a result - refused prenatal testing during their third
pregnancies and carried to term.
Genetic testing can have very real impacts on one's immediate
conduct. Avoiding hard choices is one reason some decide that
ignorance is, if not bliss, at least preferable to the cold, crystal ball.
The knowledge conferred by genetic tests can thrust upon people the
choice to undergo a mastectomy or to abort a baby a couple truly
wants to have.39 That people desperately wish to avoid doing either
is a reason they might have for not wanting the knowledge in the
first place.
3. Genetic Information That Hurts. In the crystal ball, we may
also see futures that require no conduct but that are bleak and
frightening. We may be psychologically unprepared for the images
of ourselves that we discover in the analytic brush strokes of genetic
assays.4" Confirming what we may suspect from family histories,
genetic tests might, while eliminating the anxiety of uncertainty,
also eliminate hope and cause psychological harm.4 ' On the other
hand, more precise knowledge might vindicate hope, though perhaps
even then not without cost.42 This quandary only becomes more

genetic mutations).
" Amy Harmon, Dilemma: Deal with Disability,orAbort?,LEXINGTON HERALD-LEADER,
June 20, 2004, at A20.
3
Andrews, supra note 36, at 984 (citing S. Adam et al., Five Year Study of Prenatal
Testing for Huntington's Disease: Demand, Attitudes, and Psychological Assessment, 30 J.
MED. GENETICS 549, 552 (1993)).
9 See supra notes 33, 36 and accompanying text.
o See Angela Liang, Note, The ArgumentAgainsta Physician'sDuty to Warn for Genetic
Diseases: The Conflicts Created by Safer v. Estate Of Pack, 1 J. HEALTH CARE L. &
POL'y 437, 444-45 (1998) ("Mhe term 'shattered self-adequacy syndrome' has been devised
to describe the chronic stress that the diagnosis of a genetic disorder creates." (citing D.
Marianne Brower Blair, Lifting the GenealogicalVeil: A Blueprintfor Legislative Reform of
the Disclosure of Health-RelatedInformationin Adoption, 70 N.C. L. REv. 681, 697 (1992))).
41 Ruth Chadwick, The Philosophy of the Right to Know and the Right Not to Know, in
THE RIGHT TO KNOW AND THE RIGHT NOT TO KNOW 13, 18 (Ruth Chadwick et al. eds., 1997).
42 See, e.g., Graeme T. Laurie, ChallengingMedical-LegalNorms: The Role ofAutonomy,
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pervasive as, with the increased use of genetic screening, "more and
more people come to know that they are at risk from a serious
disease with no real chance of reducing that risk or of obtaining an
effective treatment."43
What studies have been done are not at all clear on the
Some
psychological effects of predictive genetic testing.
that
genetic
testing
can
cause
commentators have suggested
depression and suicide. 4 Studies have demonstrated at least some
negative impact on family ftmctioning from predictive testing for
Huntington's Disease-a test that can confirm with near-certainty
whether one will develop this disabling disease.45 The data are
inconclusive, 46 but likely suffer from substantial selection bias.4 7 It
may well be that living with the knowledge that one will develop an
incurable disease turns out to be better than living with
uncertainty. At least, it may only be different rather than "worse."
When asked what it was like finally to know that she had
Huntington's, one young woman replied that" '[i]t's hard to think
the other way anymore of not knowing,' .... 'It's become a part of
my life.' .48

Confidentiality,and Privacy in ProtectingIndividual and FamilialGroup Rights in Genetic
Information, 22 J. LEGAL MED. 1, 13-14 (2001) (discussing studies in which families affected
by genetic disease may have nonaffected family members who feel guilt due to their status).

4" R. Andorno, The Right Not to Know: An Autonomy Based Approach, 30 J. MED.
ETHICS 435, 435 (2004).

" See Sonia M. Suter, Disentangling Privacy from Property: Toward a Deeper
Understandingof Genetic Privacy, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 737, 775 (2004) (citing studies
demonstrating individuals have developed depression or committed suicide after testing
positive for Huntington disease gene).
41 See Susan K Sobel & D. Brookes Cowan, Impact of Genetic Testing for Huntington
Disease on the Family System, 90 AM. J. MED. GENETIcS 49, 49 (2000) (finding that family
membership, family communication patterns, and familial roles were impacted by test); see
also Laurie, supra note 42, at 13 (discussing studies revealing that inadequate account of
genetic screening's psychological effects have led to failures of national screening programs).
46 See Suter, supra note 44, at 775 n.188 (citing several studies that found negative
psychological impacts following genetic testing and one study finding no unusual high distress
levels in three years following test); Sandi Wiggins et al., The Psychological Consequencesof
Predictive Testingfor Huntington'sDisease,327 NEW ENG. J.MED. 1401, 1404 (1992) (finding
fewer incidences of depression and higher index of well-being among those tested for
Huntington's than those who were not after twelve months).
47 See Suter, supra note 44, at 776 n.189 (noting that far fewer have taken Huntington's
test than said they would in surveys, and that only around 10%-15% of at-risk adults avail
themselves of genetic screening).
' Harmon, supra note 23.
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4. Security and Privacy. Even if someone is prepared
emotionally to receive his genetic information, he may not want
anyone else to receive that information. Keeping such information
secret from others because of the harms that dissemination might
cause is not the direct concern of this Article. However, the worry
that being tested at all will result in unwanted dissemination is a
reason an individual may have for refusing a test and remaining
ignorant.
The fear of genetic discrimination is no longer the stuff of science
fiction. Angela Liang points to "more than two hundred cases where
healthy people were denied health insurance or employment
because of their genetic makeup" and to surveys revealing that
those at familial risk for genetic diseases experienced fairly
widespread difficulty obtaining adequate health insurance.4 9
Indeed, doctors have reported cases in which "patients who could
make more informed health care decisions if they learned whether
they had inherited an elevated risk of diseases like breast and colon
cancer refuse to do so because of the potentially dire economic
consequences. 5 °
These fears may be eased somewhat by a new federal law. The
Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act prohibits insurance
companies and employers from discriminating based on genetic
status and from requiring genetic testing.5 ' Importantly however,
the law does not apply to providers of life, disability, or long-term
care insurance and may be difficult to enforce.5 2
Genetic
49 Liang, supra note 40, at 448.
'0 Amy Harmon,FearofInsuranceTrouble LeadsMany to Shun or HideDNA Tests, N.Y.

TIMEs, Feb. 24, 2008, at Al.
5' See 29 U.S.C.A. § 1182 (West, Westlaw through P.L. 110-233) (forbidding genetic
discrimination by health insurance companies); 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000ff (West, Westlaw through
P.L. 110-233) (stating it will be effective eighteen months after May 21, 2008 and governing
employer genetic discrimination). There are a number of state regulations as well. See, e.g.,
William F. Mulholland, II & Ami S. Jaeger, Comment, Genetic Privacyand Discrimination:
A Survey of State Legislation, 39JURIMETRICS 317,317 (1999) (revealing that nearly all states
had or were considering laws to prevent genetic discrimination). It is uncertain how these
will interact with the new federal law.
52 See Amy Harmon, Congress Passes Bill to Bar Bias Based on Genes, N.Y. TIMES,
May 2, 2008, at Al (noting bill only covers health insurers and employers); Brandon Keim,
Genetic ProtectionsSkimp on Privacy,Says Gene Tester,WIRED, May 23, 2008, http'/blog.wi
red.com/wiredscience/2008/05/genetic-protect.html (interviewing Tera Eerkes, founder of
personal genetic testing company).
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information, in spite of laws meant to make it less so, is still
somewhat risky information to uncover, and many rationally could
prefer to remain ignorant.
B. HIV TESTING

1. Fearof Knowing. In 1987, determined to do something about
the AIDS epidemic that was then an epicenter of public anxiety, the
Illinois legislature passed, and Governor James R. Thompson
signed, a law conditioning the grant of marriage licenses on proof
that the partners to the proposed marriage had been tested for HIV
and then informed of the results of each other's tests.53 Though it
was opposed by the state's health department and called "a
ridiculous example of institutionalized panic" by public health
officials, 5' this statute was not a policy outrider. Most other states
were considering similar legislation at the time, but the tide was
turning, even in Illinois.5 5 After the law went into effect, a
substantial number of engaged couples made for the state's borders,
and the law was repealed after only twenty months.5 6
There are certainly stories one could tell about this episode
related to collective hysteria, political malfunction, or train wrecks
of science and policy. But the incident is useful here to consider why
people might be inclined to go out of their way to avoid learning

53 40 ILL. CoMP. STAT. ANN. § 204(b) (West 1988) (repealed 1989). The statute required
the presentation to the county clerk of a certificate from a physician "indicat[ing] that the
required tests were administered and that the results [were] provided to both parties, but...
not indicat[ing] the results of the tests." Id. The test had to be taken within the thirty days
prior to application for the license, and physicians were required to give notice of positive
results to both parties and to the state health department. Id.
" Isabel Wilkerson, Illinoisians Fault Prenuptial Tests for AIDS, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 16, 1988, at A6.
See id. (noting that thirty-three states besides Illinois had considered similar laws).
Jack McKillip, The Effect ofMandatoryPremaritalHIVTesting on Marriage:The Case
of Illinois, 81 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 650, 650 (1991). McKillip analyzed marriage data from
Illinois and surrounding states during and around the period of the law's enforcement. Id.
He found a 14% drop in marriage rates while the law was enforced, a rebound when it was
repealed, and an increase in marriages in bordering states roughly equal to the drop in
Illinois. Id. at 652. See also Julie D. Levinson, Note, While IgnoranceMay Not Be Bliss, It
Is a Mother's Right: Implications of Testing Newborn Babies for RIV, 3 CARDOZO WOMEN'S
L.J. 71, 81 (1996) (citing studies that found 40,000 people left Illinois and married elsewhere
while statute was in effect).
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their HIV status, which is surely an important health datum in
anyone's life.
Opponents of the law often pointed to its cost, both to individuals
and to the health system generally." If cost were the driving force
causing couples to marry out of state, then the Illinois experience is
not a good example of a challenge to individuals' interests in not
knowing. Someone who foregoes an HIV test on account of its cost
may not necessarily have any real interest in not knowing his HIV
status.58 All that can be said is that the value to him of this
knowledge is less than the monetary cost of being tested.5 9
One study, however, considered and rejected the hypothesis that
cost could account for the declines it found in Illinois marriage rates
attributable to the law."° Though its conclusion on this score was
not empirical, the author's reasoning is compelling. He noted that
the mean testing cost was only around $30.61 This small amount
was less than the difference in cost of a marriage license in
Wisconsin and one in Illinois. The Wisconsin license cost $35 more,
leaving aside Wisconsin's longer waiting period and whatever
logistical expenses couples incurred traveling there. 2 These facts
provide some confidence that many couples that avoided marrying
in Illinois on account of the law truly desired not to be tested at all.

" See Wilkerson, supra note 54 (citing test costs from $25 to $300 a person). Even if cost
was not a prime motivation for couples to wed in another state, Illinois's program was very
expensive overall, costing perhaps over $300,000 for each HIV positive individual identified.
Bernard J. Turnock & Chester J. Kelly, Mandatory Premarital Testing for Human
Immunodeficiency Virus: The IllinoisExperience, 261 JAMA 3415, 3418 (1989).
' While all of the interests in ignorance I discuss here could be considered knowledge
costs that sometimes outweigh the simultaneous knowledge benefits, the commitment of
resources needed to acquire knowledge is not a category of deterrents to knowing that I will
discuss. Rather, my focus is on subjective judgments that would lead to a preference for
ignorance even if the information that could dispel it were freely available. The effect of
pricing on knowledge flows is critically important, but I leave consideration of it for another
day. See generally Amy Kapczynski, The Access to Knowledge Mobilization and the New
Politics of IntellectualProperty, 117 YALE L.J. 804 (2008) (examining politics of intellectual
property law from perspective of access to knowledge).
" Such low, but nonnegative, values could be due to high confidence in one's HIV
negative status, either from an evaluation of risk factors or from a fairly recent test, or to a
prior positive test result. In the latter case, the value of a new test decreases with the
confidence in the former test or tests.
6 McKillip, supra note 56, at 652.
61
62

Id.
Id.
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The author speculated that a more general wish to avoid the
subject of AIDS altogether could be the real reason for the border
hopping: "Perhaps AIDS had become such a specter that the issue
itself is to be avoided. Couples may have chosen a way around this
unhappy topic by being married in a state that allowed them to
without testing."6 3 Perhaps, but traveling to another state to get
married specifically to avoid HIV testing does seem an odd way to
avoid the issue of AIDS.
There does not appear to be a clear answer as to why this
significant drop in marriages accompanied Illinois's HIV testing
prerequisite. One suspects that each couple had a slightly different
mix of reasons for their decision. Some may have worried that their
testing information would be reported to state agencies. Others may
have wanted to shield the information from themselves or even their
spouse. But, whatever the reasons, getting married out of state
represented a choice to remain ignorant of HIV status, at least for
those who had not yet tested positive, and even to incur additional
expense to do so.
When surveyed, people who refuse HIV testing give varying
reasons for their refusal. A South African household survey found
that the bulk of refusals stemmed from aversion to blood draw,
sometimes on religious grounds and sometimes not.6 4 Not wanting
to learn one's HIV status was the reason given by 7% of
respondents.6 5 One study in Los Angeles aimed at determining
reasons for refusal found that "don't want to know" was cited
by 23.9% of the subjects, with concerns about confidentiality cited
by 2.2%.66 Other studies have found the primary reasons given for
refusal to be "already tested" and "not at risk," with much lower
rates of other answers.67

'

Id. at 653 (citation omitted).
NELSON MANDELA FOUNDATION, SOUTH AFRICAN NATIONAL HIV PREVALENCE, HIV

INCIDENCE, BEHAVIOUR AND COMMUNICATION SURVEY 32 (2005), available at httpi/www.hsr
cpress.ac.za/product.php?productid=2134.
65 Id.
' Paul A. Simon et al., Reasonsfor HIVAntibody Test Refusal in a HeterosexualSexually
TransmittedDisease Clinic Population, 10 AIDS 1549, 1549 (1996).
67 See, e.g., Rebecca V. Liddicoat et al., Refusing HIV Testing in an Urgent Care Setting:
Results from the "Think HIV" Program,20 AIDS PATIENT CARE & STDs 84,89 (2006) (finding
'not at risk" to be most popular response). The authors claimed that the two dominant
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Clearly, there is a great deal of variation in these findings.
Notably, despite claims that better understanding of HIV would
reduce refusal rates, at least one study has suggested that there is
no such correlation.' Another notes that people often overestimate
the distress that will accompany a positive result and, interestingly,
underestimate their distress after a negative result.69
Whatever the precise incidence of and number of justifications,
many people around the world still desire not to be tested for HIV.
Though HIV can now be managed, at least by those lucky enough to
live in richer nations, as a chronic illness, it still is a dreaded
disease that carries serious social and physical burdens. Learning
that one carries HIV not only conveys information about one's own
medical status, but it is also tantamount to learning that
unprotected sex with a partner may harm that partner and that
sharing needles may harm those with whom one shares.7 ° It is, in
short, to become aware that one's lifestyle may have to change in
order to avoid harming others and that one's own life, even if not
tragically shortened, will now include significant medical
interventions and side effects.
The fact that many people prefer not to be tested should not come
as a surprise to policymakers. After all, most states have passed
statutes preventing HIV testing without informed consent, often
with specific procedures for obtaining that consent.7 1 Unlike most
responses were often erroneous and that much better HIV detection would occur if subjects
(a) did not rely on old testing data and (b) had more accurate self-perceptions of risk. Id. at 90.
The authors found only one percent refused because the information was "too personal." Id.
at 89. The rest refused either because they were "feeling too sick," because testing "took too
long," or because they already knew they were HIV positive. Id.
e' See T.A. Duffy et al., Women's Knowledge and Attitudes, and the Acceptability of
Voluntary Antenatal HIV Testing, 105 BRIT. J. OBSTETRICS & GYNAECOLOGY 849, 849 (1998)
("This study.., has shown that knowledge regarding HIV is good but does not increase the
uptake of testing.").
' Elaine M. Sieffet al., Anticipated Versus Actual Reaction to HIV Test Results, 112 AM.
J.PSYCHOL. 297, 297 (1999).
70 Though it is true that unprotected sex always carries risks, knowing that one is H1V
positive provides evidence that it poses a substantial risk of serious harm to one's
(unprotected) sex partners. I am not concerned at the moment with whether this information
will or should actually change behavior or whether any change in behavior is something the
law should mandate, encourage, or ignore.
71 See generally State Statutes Dealing with HIV andAIDS: A Comprehensive State-ByState Summary, 13 LAW & SEXUALITY 1 (2004) [hereinafter State Statutes] (surveying state
AIDS and HIV legislation). There are interesting exceptions in nearly every state to an
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situations in which medical informed consent is solicited, in the HIV
testing context the informed consent procedure is intended to
ascertain whether the individual truly wants to know a medical fact
about himself, not whether he wishes to undergo a particular
medical procedure that poses both risks and benefits.
2. Security. In addition to the harms some people fear they
would experience upon learning their test results, concern over the
insecurity of their testing information is also a reason some might
choose to remain ignorant of their HIV status. As frightful as it is
to know one has a deadly disease, the consequences of others
knowing that fact can be even worse. Others could use the
information to discriminate in employment or in providing
insurance.73 Women who are pregnant and HIV positive may, with
some justification, fear interference with their maternal rights.7
On the other hand, one study found no correlation between the
adoption of mandatory reporting laws, which require the filing of
names of HIV-positive individuals with the state's health agency,
and voluntary testing.75 If these findings are robust,76 they suggest
that most people are not concerned either with the risk of
dissemination, as they estimate it, or the effects of dissemination of

individual's right to refuse testing, including the testing of prisoners and especially sex
offenders, testing of donations from blood donors, testing after a health care worker or public
safety officer suffers a possible exposure to blood products, and more. See, e.g., id. at 5-10
(citing provisions of Alabama code that contain these exceptions).
72 Some might argue that the requirement to obtain informed consent isjustified by the
fact that HIV testing is a medical procedure. Perhaps, but if that is all that justifies it, then
the scope of information necessary to disclose would be limited to the risks, benefits, and
alternatives to the various means of HIV testing-the minuscule risks of blood draw and
efficacy of the various tests. In short, the informed consent procedure would be meaningless.
7 See, e.g., Martha A. Field, Pregnancyand AIDS, 52 MD. L. REV. 402, 409-10 (1993)
(stating that some insurance providers, employers, and health organizations ask applicants
about previous AIDS tests).
74 See Levinson, supra note 56, at 81 ("For example, in several instances women have
temporarily lost custody of their children due to their conduct before the child's birth. In
addition, several existing statutes might be employed to punish HIV-positive women who give
birth to HIV-infected children."); see also Scott H. Isaacman, Are We OutlawingMotherhood
for HlV-Infected Women?, 22 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 479,482 (1991) (noting that HIV-transmission
statutes might be applied to pregnant women like narcotics law).
75 N.Y. STATE DEP'TOF HEALTH AIDS INST., THE IMPACT OF NEW YORK'S HIV REPORTING
AND PARTNER NOTIFICATION (HIVRPN) LAW: GENERAL FINDINGS REPORT 29, 34 (2006)
[hereinafter N.Y. IMPACT REPORT).
"' Several serious methodological limitations were reported. Id. at vi.

322

GEORGIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43:297

their HIV status, that people are not sufficiently informed or
thoughtful about the effects of dissemination, that people effectively
undermine the law by avoiding reporting, or that people are
generally unfamiliar with the law and thus its effect on the security
of their HIV status information. There are some data to support the
latter alternative."
Whether people generally accept or are unaware of the risk of
dissemination of their HIV status under state reporting procedures,
some may choose not to be tested to remain ignorant themselves and
avoid this risk. We need not find that all or even a majority of
individuals have serious security concerns to decide to protect the
interests of those who do.
The relatively certainty provided by a test result is not the only
kind of HIV status information that governments disseminate.
Many states have passed partner notification laws requiring that
any partners of the HIV-positive patient, including spouses, sexual
partners, and people with whom a patient has shared needles, be
notified that they may have been exposed and that they should be
tested.78
These laws affect both those who have been tested, presenting
another set of security concerns, and those who are notified. First,
it might be suspected that these laws would discourage people from
being tested, for fear that notification will have the effect of
disseminating their HIV status information in ways that are
harmful, even if their names are omitted. The fear that finding out
one's HIV status will likely cause others to learn it as well may
obviously be a reason not to be tested. However, one study found
that the introduction of a partner notification law in New York had
no effect on HIV testing rates.7 9 It is not obvious, though, whether
this indicates that people who would seek tests are undeterred by
the prospect of partner notification. As with studies indicating that
reporting to government health departments has no effect on testing
rates, the negative finding here could be explained by a host of

"

See id. at xiv (finding limited awareness of New York's mandatory reporting law).

71 See, e.g., N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2133 (McKinney 2002) (requiring notification to

contacts of the HIV-infected person).
' N.Y. IMPACT REPORT, supranote 75, at 34.
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factors, from ease of evasion to lack of knowledge about the
program. Indeed, two-thirds of HIV-positive individuals identified
in the calendar years 2001 to 2003 reported no partners at all."°
3. The Ignorance Interests of Others. The other party whose
interest in not knowing is implicated by partner notification laws is
the notified partner. These laws contain no mechanism by which
the partner can completely opt out of being informed he or she has
been placed at risk. sl Short of a statewide pre-registration
approach, there is no practical way to ascertain someone's
preference for the information without disclosing substantially all
of it.
Though the information provided by notification improves on the
estimation of an individual's risk of HIV infection over
background,82 it may not, in particular cases, improve an
individual's own estimation at all. Some people who are contacted
under such programs will be well aware that they have engaged in
risky behavior with individuals who may be HIV positive.8 3 The
more, however, that the information does improve risk estimation,
the more useful it might be and, at the same time, the more
distressing. "A study of 132 partners of HIV-positive individuals
located through health department notification found that 87%
thought the Health Department did the right thing in telling them

80 Id. at 22.
Sl See, e.g., N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2133 (containing no opt out provision).
82 Several studies have examined partner testing rates and the rates of HIV positive tests
among notified partners. The numbers vary. Anywhere from 65%--97% of notified partners
agree to be tested, with from 10%-20% of those turning out to be HIV positive. See Centers
for Disease Control and Prevention, Dep't of Health & Human Services, PartnerCounseling
and ReferralServices to Identify Persons with Undiagnosed HIV- North Carolina,2001, 52
MORB1DITY & MORTALiTYWKLY. REP. 1181, 1881-82 (2003) [hereinafter PartnerCounseling]
(studying South Carolina patients); Johan Giesecke et al., Efficacy ofPartnerNotificationfor
HIV Infection, 338 THE LANCET 1096, 1096 (1991) (studying Swedish patients); Randolph F.
Wykoffet al., Notification ofthe Sex andNeedle-SharingPartnersofIndividualswith Human
Immunodeficiency Virus in Rural South Carolina: 30-Month Experience, 18 SEXUALLY
TRANSMMrED DISEASES 217, 219 (1991) (studying South Carolina patients and finding 97%
agreement rate to testing).
' Indeed, studies indicate many notified partners have already been tested for HIV, and
of those, a significant percentage have already tested positive. See, e.g., PartnerCounseling,
supra note 82, at 1182 (finding 68% of previously tested partners were HIV positive).
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about their exposure, and 92% thought that the Health Department
should continue to notify persons exposed to HIV.'
Many are obviously happy to learn their HIV status, and there is
now great therapeutic benefit in doing so. This has not always been5
the case, and many still prefer not to know for various reasons.8
Whatever becomes of social attitudes toward HIV testing, incurable
infectious diseases-the diagnoses of which present only altruistic
benefits to those tested-will surely continue to present serious
information regulation problems. Thus, this example reminds us
that the rationality of a desire for ignorance, to the extent we can
assess it, may be entirely dependent on social context.
C. RACE AND APPLICATIONS

In 1995, and again in 1998, the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System proposed a rule that would permit nonmortgage
lenders to ask potential borrowers their sex, race, religion, and
national origin. 8 Though the governing federal statute, the Equal
Credit Opportunity Act, does not explicitly bar the collection of such
information, it does prohibit the use of race and other status
information in making lending decisions.8 7 However the Board's
regulations implementing the statute have long prohibited these
lenders from "inquir[ing] about the race, color, religion, national
origin, or sex of an applicant or any other person in connection with
a credit transaction."88
Obviously, to the extent that racism is a problem in lending, one
way to combat it is to prohibit the lender from knowing an
applicant's race altogether. Even an avowed racist is unable to
discriminate if he or she does not know the race of the person with

" N.Y. IMPACT REPORT, supra note 75, at 5 (citation omitted); see also Jeffrey L. Jones
et al., PartnerAcceptance of Health Department Notification of HIV exposure, South
Carolina,264 JAMA 1284, 1285 (1990).
' See Jones et al., supra note 84, at 1285 (discussing reasons notified partners gave that
notification was harmful, including depression, loss of confidentiality, and upset partners).
86 Equal Credit Opportunity, 60 Fed. Reg. 20,436, 20,436 (Apr. 26, 1995) (to be codified
at 12 C.F.R. pt. 202); Equal Credit Opportunity, 63 Fed. Reg. 12,326, 12,328 (Mar. 12, 1998)
(to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 202).
87 15 U.S.C. § 1691(a)(1) (2006).
m 12 C.F.R. § 202.5(b) (2008).
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whom he or she is dealing. Though an information prohibition
approach may be effective in reducing discrimination, especially
when transactions are not conducted face to face, various federal
agencies, including the Department of Justice, expressed their
"belie[fl that the ability to obtain and analyze data about race and
ethnicity (such as creditors might collect on a voluntary basis) would
aid fair lending enforcement."89 Additionally, a few creditors
suggested that collecting the information could help them to
"evaluate compliance with fair lending laws" and to develop
"marketing and outreach initiatives."9 °
Information prohibition is not the strategy of Title VII. Under
federal antidiscrimination in employment laws, employers are free
to collect race information, for example, from potential employees so
long as they do not use it to discriminate. 9 ' The Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) cautions, however, that eliciting
race information "unless otherwise explained, may constitute
evidence of discrimination prohibited by Title VII." 92 Notably, many
state employment antidiscrimination regimes do prohibit the
collection of race information.9"
This difference in approach, between regulating knowledge to
prevent harmful conduct and prohibiting only the conduct itself, is
an interesting dynamic that is found in many areas of knowledge
regulation. But its relevance to this Article lies in the attitude of
the regulated community. Among those most opposed to lifting the
ban on collection of status information by nonmortgage lenders were
"banks and banking trade associations"94 and their congressional
9 Equal Credit Opportunity, 64 Fed. Reg. 44,582, 44,586 (Aug. 16, 1999) (to be codified
at 12 C.F.R. pt. 202).

90Id.
91 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2000) (prohibiting employers from using this information
to discriminate but not prohibiting them from collecting it).
92 OFFICE OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, PREEMPLOYMENT INQUIRIES & EEO LAw (1981), reprinted in 2 EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES
GUIDE 4143,4143 (Commerce Clearing House, Inc. 2008). This source was cited in Mark A.
Rothstein, Wrongful Refusal to Hire: Attacking the Other Half of the Employment-At-Will
Rule, 24 CONN. L. REv. 97, 124 n.146 (1991). Rothstein noted that "[blecause merely
requesting the information is illegal in some states and the use of the information is illegal
under federal law, it is questionable why a rational employer would seek to obtain the
information." Id.
93 See, e.g., W. VA. CODE ANN. § 5-11-9(2) (LexisNexis 2006 & Supp. 2008).
" 64 Fed. Reg. at 44,586.
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allies. Mustering what can only be described as an unusually
healthy level of consumer empathy, Senator Phil Gramm, then
Chair of the Senate Banking Committee, issued a press release:
"Allowing banks and other creditors to collect information about the
race, religion or national origin of their would-be clients will once
again raise the specter of abusive creditors injecting prejudice into
the credit process."95
The institutional interests of the lending community were
reflected more directly in comment letters on the proposed rule
change. Their concerns fell into several categories, which can be
reduced to concerns about cost and liability.9 6 First, lenders worried
about the economic impact on them of keeping such records.9 7 Even
if collecting and keeping the information were only voluntary, they
were concerned that the rule would eventually lead to a requirement
to collect such data. 98
Second, collection could lead to "unfair" use of the data. 99 If the
data were collected, it would be mined and claims of discrimination
could be manufactured either by the Justice Department,
regulators, or plaintiffs.0 0 The concern is not so much with the
harm that will befall a lender on account of its knowledge, but with
the harm that will occur if others have access to the information.
However, since much lending does not occur face to face but via
telephone, mail, and even over the Internet, remaining ignorant of
the borrower's status is an excellent way to avoid the inference that
the potential borrower's status was taken into account. As the
Credit Union National Association (CUNA) put it in a letter to the
Board:

9 Press Release, Senate Banking Committee, Committee Republicans Urge Federal
Reserve to Drop Plan to Collect Data on Credit Applicants (Dec. 6, 1999), availableat httpJ/
banking.senate.gov/prel99/1206fed.htm.
96 See Equal Credit Opportunity, 68 Fed. Reg. 13,144, 13,148 (Mar. 18, 2003) (to be
codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 202) (listing industry concerns reported in comments to 1998
proposed changes).
9

Id.

9

Id.

9 Id.
" Not collecting the information, lenders worried, would only lead to another set of bad
inferences: that they had something to hide. Furthermore, commenters argued the data
would be unreliable on account of a lack of standardized collection techniques and notation.
Id.
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Borrowers may perceive that the information is being
used to discriminate, regardless of how it is actually
used by the creditor. Borrowers may be uncomfortable
providing such information and if denied credit, these
This
borrowers may feel discriminated against.
perception should not be facilitated by permitting the
collection of this information.'0 1
In other words, lenders prefer not to have this information because
having it permits the inference that the information was used
illegally.
In 1996 and again in 2003, the Board decided not to drop the
information collection prohibition.' 2 Instead, in its 2003 rule
amendment, the Board opted to enlarge the "self-test" privilege to
permit collection of status information.0 3 Information collected as
part of a self-test is privileged from disclosure to regulators or
plaintiffs. 0 4 So learning race information in this manner does not
pose the same degree of security or bad-inference concerns that
caused the industry to oppose dropping the prohibition (though,
perhaps importantly, the fact that a self-test was conducted is not
privileged, nor is the fact that information was collected). 1°'
However, self-tests must be actual tests that will lead to corrective
action to comply with ECOA, and thus are not a vehicle through
which such status information can be routinely and continuously
collected. 10 6

10

Letter from Jeffirey Bloch, Assistant General Counsel, CUNA, to Jennifer J. Johnson,

Sec'y, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. (Nov. 10, 1999), available at http://www.cuna.
org/reg-advocacy/commentjletterscl_111099.html.
102 Equal Credit Opportunity, 61 Fed. Reg. 68,688, 68,688 (Dec. 30, 1996) (to be codified
at 12 C.F.R. pt. 202); Equal Credit Opportunity, 68 Fed. Reg. 13,144, 13,149 (Mar. 18, 2003)

(to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 202).
Collection for a self-test requires disclosure to the
103 12 C.F.R. § 202.5(b)(1) (2008).
applicant that providing the information is voluntary, that it is being requested in order to
monitor compliance with ECOA, that federal law bars discriminatory use of the information
or discrimination on the basis of a refusal to provide information, and that if not the provided
lender may use visual information or surname to attempt to collect the information. Id.
104 See 15 U.S.C. § 1691c-1(a) (2006) (describing circumstances where self-test is privileged
information).
105 Id.
106 See 12 C.F.R. § 202.15(b) (defining self-test).
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The lenders involved in this regulatory tussle sought to preserve
ignorance as a means to avoid successful, or just expensive,
accusations of discrimination. Whatever value knowledge of the
race or gender of loan applicants would have for them, the value of
ignorance, as a shield, is greater. But this is not a shield meant to
hide bad conduct. Only with knowledge could the lenders cause the
harm at which the law is aimed.
D. LAWYERS AND OTHER AGENTS

Finally, consider knowledge that is unwelcome to practicing
lawyers. Just as patient autonomy has become the dominant lens
through which medical ethical dilemmas are resolved, so too has
client autonomy been exalted in modern legal practice. 10 7 The
general public appreciates that the essence of a lawyer's role, at
least in our adversarial system, is to represent, and perhaps to
advance, the interests of his or her client before courts and in
negotiations with others. Lawyering, though, is a profession,
complete with external and internal obligations that may conflict
with a lawyer's ability to serve as a mere educated conduit for
whatever tale a client desires to present to a court or to his
adversaries.
Monroe Freedman has described one manifestation of this rolerelated tension, calling it the "perjury trilemma." °8 The trilemma
arises when a lawyer is faced with a client who wants to put on
perjured testimony or otherwise present false evidence. This

107 See, e.g., Katherine R. Kruse, Fortressin the Sand: The Plural
Values of ClientCenteredRepresentation,12 CLINICALL. REV. 369,375-85 (describing the client-centeredview
of lawyering and noting that it arose as part of"a larger movement to demystify professional
expertise and reallocate power between professionals and clients"). In her discussion of the
now dominant, client-centered approach to clinical legal education, Kruse cites the
observations of the movement's founders:
Binder and Price note that clients "are remarkably sensitive to, and easily
swayed by, what they guess their lawyer thinks is best for them." When
a client makes a decision based on what the client "surmises the lawyer
thinks is best," the authors argued, the lawyer has illegitimately usurped
what should be client decision-making.
Id. at 379 (quoting DAVID A. BINDER & SUSAN C. PRICE, LEGAL INTERVIEWING AND

COUNSELING: A CLIENT-CENTERED APPROACH 166 (1977)).
'08 MONROE H. FREEDMAN, UNDERSTANDING LAWYES' ETHIcs 109 (1990).
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predicament exposes the lawyer's incompatible commitments to (1)
zealous representation and diligent investigation, (2) the duty of
confidentiality, and (3) serving as an honest officer of the court.1°9
Whatever existential crisis this quandary creates for the
profession, the rules that codify these commitments mandate a
resolution. Rule 3.3 of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct
provides:
A lawyer shall not knowingly... make a false statement
of fact or law to a tribunal... [or] offer evidence that the
A lawyer may refuse to
lawyer knows to be false ....
offer evidence, other than the testimony of a defendant
in a criminal matter, that the lawyer reasonably believes
is false."1
Put differently, "the rules of professional duty leave no room for
knowing violations, but they do leave some room for not knowing.""'
If a lawyer "knows" the client's evidence or testimony is false, the
lawyer is forbidden from offering it. Something short of "knowing"
is sufficient to give the lawyer grounds for refusing to put on the
client's evidence or otherwise putting the brakes on what would be
his duty to be the client's zealot.
And yet, the lawyer's role as client's agent is deeply engrained.
Freedman argues that it is a betrayal of the client to refuse to put
on "false" evidence." 2 Whether this view is accepted by courts and
state bars-and it generally is not-is not the point. Many lawyers
do view their role this way and, thus, may attempt to maximize
their ability to commit to zealous representation and minimize their
role as officer of the court. The result: what Freedman calls
"selective ignorance." 3
'09 Id. at 111.
110 MODEL RuLEs OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.3 (2002).

Though Rule 3.3 perhaps best

exemplifies the conflicting duties facing lawyers, Rule 4.1 places a similar obligation of candor
on lawyers with respect to their communications to third parties. Id. at R. 4.1
"
Stephen Ellmann, Truth and Consequences, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 895, 908 (2000).
112 See FREEDMAN, supra note 108, at 111 (arguing that sacrificing the duty of candor to
court is the only way to resolve perjury trilemma and maintain "traditional lawyer-client

model").
113 Id. at 109-10, 130.
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"The idea is to inform the client in advance that there are some
things which the attorney would prefer not to know, and that if the
attorney should learn of them, she may have to pass them on to the
judge or adverse party."" 4 The lawyer thereby makes a decision,
without knowing what would be revealed, to leave to the client the
decision whether information might be damaging enough to justify
withholding it. The ABA, Freedman, and the courts are all allied
against this technique, though not in how it should be eliminated.115
They say that encouraging the client to withhold, in order to permit
the lawyer not to disclose, interferes too greatly with the
professional obligation of the lawyer to represent the client's
interests and to investigate the case."' In addition, clients will be
inhibited from confiding in their attorneys.
Another strategy the lawyer may undertake to avoid the harm he
or she sees in disclosure is to learn the information in a way that
will not ascribe knowledge to her. The lawyer may do this by
encouraging the client to speak in hypotheticals. Doing so enables
the lawyer to receive information in such a way that she can later
make the claim (perhaps only to herself as she lies awake at night)
that she did not gain relevant knowledge. The information might
objectively be viewed only as referring to a hypothetical, but the
lawyer decodes the information into knowledge of what actually
happened. Freedman refers to this strategy as "disingenuous, " "'
rather than "selective ignorance." It enables the lawyer to "have it
both ways," gaining the tactical advantage of knowledge and the
immunity-providing benefit of ignorance."'
In both cases, the lawyer has acted to avoid gaining knowledge
that she believes will harm her interests. The lawyer believes her
interests are nearly perfectly aligned with those of her client, and so
she seeks to avoid the disclosure to adversaries and the court of
information that will damage the client's case. Ignorance allows the

11

Robert C. Horgan, Note, Making Black and White out of Gray: An Attorney's Duty To

Investigate Suspected Client Fraud,29 NEW ENG. L. REv. 795, 851 (1995) (citation omitted).
"5 See id. at 852 (citing Miranda warnings as example of selective ignorance).
"' See id. (statement that ABA and courts believe selective ignorance deprives client of
"guiding hand of counsel").
117 FREEDMAN, supra note 108, at 141.
"1

Id. at 119.
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lawyer to avoid the choice between disclosing damaging evidence
and accepting a risk of punishment for failure to disclose the
evidence. Through selective ignorance, she attempts to insulate
herself from the damaging information, even to the point of
depriving herself of whatever use she could have made of it.
Through disingenuousness, she also seeks to avoid having to
disclose but does so without paying the price of remaining truly
ignorant.
In these cases, ignorance confers a benefit, in the form of
immunity from legal rules, that enables desirable conduct: using
evidence without fear that she must disclose its falsity.
III. TYPES OF IGNORANCE INTERESTS
A. SOME SIMPLE DISTINCTIONS

From these examples, we can begin to appreciate that a desire for
ignorance is not so unusual, is sometimes rational or at least
understandable, and may arise from quite different considerations.
In some of the examples above, knowledge was unwelcome because
it posed difficult choices to its holder. In others, knowledge posed
no uncomfortable choice at all, but simply changed the holder's view
of himself or the world around him. And in some, knowledge was
unwelcome because holding it increased the risk the holder would
convey it to others-with harm potentially flowing from their
knowledge.
To bring some order to these observations, I propose a few
distinctions that result in a small number of categories, all
summarized in the figure below. First, I will distinguish between
knowledge that harms by affecting one's conduct and knowledge
that is harmful despite having no direct effect on conduct. In the
first category are forms of knowledge that tend to compel conduct
the holder does not want to undertake or to restrain conduct which
the holder wishes to perform. Because these kinds of knowledge
either provoke or inhibit conduct, I will call them provocative and
inhibitory knowledge, respectively. Each may be undesirable, from
the holder's viewpoint, for its interference with his or her autonomy.
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Within the second category, knowledge that harms for reasons
other than its direct impact on the holder's autonomous choices, I
will make an additional distinction. Knowledge may bring disutility
either because the substance of it is objectionable to its holder or for
reasons unrelated to the impact of the substance on the holder. If
the desire for ignorance is due to the substantive impact of the
knowledge, then I call the knowledge disruptive, as it disrupts some
desirable conception of the world to which the holder clings. If
substantive impact is immaterial, then the ignorance preference
must be due simply to the fact that the knowledge is acquired and
held.
In this last category lies the final distinction. If the simple fact
of possession of some knowledge would harm the holder, I assert
that it must be because others may disadvantage the holder if they
(a) learn of the holder's possession of the knowledge or (b) learn the
substance of the holder's knowledge.
The first sort of
disadvantageous knowledge I will call "bad inference knowledge," as
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the concern is with what others will make of the fact that the holder
possesses the knowledge. By contrast, if the fear is that others may
learn the substance of the knowledge, then the holder's concern is
with insecurity. Insecure knowledge is knowledge that if acquired
at all might be transmitted (via information of course) to others and
ultimately used by others in ways disadvantageous to the original
holder.
B. AUTONOMY-HARMING KNOWLEDGE

As the above examples illustrate, knowledge can inhibit or
provoke conduct. Knowledge can drive individuals to avoid
particular forms of conduct they find desirable or to perform
conduct they find undesirable. It is thus a kind of autonomy
constraint but one of the holder's own making. I treat these two
forms of intrusive knowledge-inhibitory knowledge and
provocative knowledge-separately.
1. Inhibitory Knowledge. Inhibitory knowledge constrains an
individual's range of "allowable conduct." That is, upon learning
something, an individual might be effectively barred, or at least
inhibited from, doing something he or she finds desirable. This
occurs because knowledge reveals that acts an individual wishes to
perform are in some way harmful. When one learns that what one
plans to do, enjoys doing, or has habitually done is harmful, the
choice whether to do it is made more difficult. A re-evaluation is
required, plans broken, old habits soured. A woman who learns she
is pregnant is pressured, even in her own internal deliberations, not
to smoke or drink. A man who learns he is HIV positive is put on
notice that engaging with others in unprotected sex or needle
sharing carries a high risk of transmitting HIV. Ignorance permits
avoidance of the difficult choice whether to forego desirable, but
harmful, conduct.
In the two preceding examples, knowledge reveals a fact of the
world that would have been true whether or not discovered by the
knowledge holder. That is, whether or not the HIV-positive man
ever received a diagnosis, he is HIV positive. Unprotected sex with
others thus poses a significant risk of transmission. Whether or not
a woman is aware she is pregnant early in her pregnancy, she is
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pregnant, and smoking and drinking may harm the developing
fetus. The knowledge gained by diagnosis does not alter these facts,
but only causes the holder to realize them.
A slightly different situation is presented by the perjury
trilemma. 119 An attorney, upon learning that her client's intended
testimony is false, may be deterred from putting on the testimony,
because doing so with the knowledge that the testimony is false
would be harmful. Even if the attorney would be happy to put on
false testimony-as would a pure, zealous advocate-doing so
carries the risk that she will be sanctioned. Had she never known,
no harm would have befallen her. She does not care that a lie was
told, only that her knowing complicity in the lie would subject her
to some kind of liability.
Now if this lawyer took seriously her role as an officer of the
court, internalizing that aspect of her role, then her position would
be similar to the HIV positive man discussed above. This lawyer
does not want to learn that planned testimony is false because it
would reveal to the lawyer that her planned conduct will be
harmful-and that it would have been so even if she had never
learned of the falsity. False testimony harms the truth-seeking
function of courts, and part of her job is to prevent such pollution of
the process. Remaining ignorant of the falsity of the testimony does
nothing to ameliorate the harm.
Though it might seem that the interests of these two lawyers, the
officer of the court and the client zealot, ought to be placed in
different categories, there is in fact no difference between their
interests in ignorance. The former desires ignorance because it
permits her to put on evidence without fear that she will be charged
with knowingly presenting false evidence. The latter, to the extent
that she has an interest in not knowing, must be motivated by the
same desire. That motivation may well be weaker than that of her
more zealous counterpart; her interest in ignorance may be
overwhelmed by her commitment to her role as an officer of the
court. But the pressure she may feel to shield herself from
information that would uncover falsity can only be due to her desire
to use the evidence despite its untruthfulness.
119 See supra notes 108-09 and accompanying text.
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In sum, the interest they have in not knowing is the same for
each, an interest in being free to put on evidence regardless of its
falsity. That is the essence of this kind of ignorance interest-to be
free to engage in conduct that knowledge may reveal is harmful.
2. ProvocativeKnowledge. The second way in which knowledge
might be harmful to its holder arises when knowledge provokes
conduct the holder views as undesirable. For example, a woman is
faced with the choice whether to undergo a mastectomy after testing
positive for the breast cancer genes. 2 ° So too, the individual
diagnosed with HIV may be compelled to notify partners, to take
medications, and to take precautions to avoid transmitting the
virus.' 2 ' And he may do so, either because the law compels him, or
because this is the conduct he would choose to perform upon
becoming aware of the diagnosis.
Just as with inhibitory knowledge, knowledge may provoke action
either because it unveils a need for the conduct that exists without
reference to the knowledge itself or because the need for conduct
commences with the knowledge itself. The woman who learns she
carries the disease-causing gene variants of BRCA-1 or BRCA-2 has
knowledge that merely reveals facts that are independent of the
knowledge itself, facts which provoke some action.
On the other hand, a homeowner who learns that his property is
contaminated with lead may have to undertake expensive
remediation or disclose this fact to buyers, not because he wants to
do so, but because the law requires it. An employer who conducts
an investigation into misconduct and uncovers wrongdoing by a
valuable employee may be obligated to fire that employee or to
undertake expensive reorganization efforts. 22 In these examples,
the holder's attitude toward the harm that law or social norms
attempt to prevent determines the nature of the holder's
disappointment in knowledge.
To the extent the actor has
internalized the same values, knowledge simply reveals conduct
that was necessary without reference to the knowledge itself-such
120
121

See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
See supra note 70 and accompanying text.

'r See, e.g., Karen W. Arenson, What OrganizationsDon't Want to Know Can Hurt,N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 22, 2006, at C1 (using various corporate examples to illustrate that more
information is not always desirable).
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as remediation, firing, notification, or taking medicine. But just as
with inhibitory knowledge, whatever the holder's attitude, his
interest in ignorance is the same-avoiding the conduct by not
knowing information that makes the conduct appear necessary.
Of course, knowledge that conduct is required in order to avoid
a bad consequence does not always produce that conduct. I am
concerned here, though, with the unwanted pressure knowledge can
bring to perform conduct. Such pressure is a reason to avoid
knowledge, regardless of whether the individual would bow to that
pressure or succumb to the harm.
Finally, I wish to distinguish provocative and inhibitory
knowledge from knowledge that is so distressing that it eventually
leads to self-destructive behavior. Though this is a kind of harmful
conduct, it is not the sort of knowledge harm I place in these two
categories. Rather, my concern here is with knowledge that reveals
action or inaction to be harmful that formerly appeared benign, or
at least more benign. One's attachment or commitment to that
conduct or inaction makes the knowledge unwelcome.
C. HARMFUL KNOWLEDGE THAT DOES NOT AFFECT CONDUCT

1. Evaluative-Framework Harms Caused by Disruptive
Knowledge. Even though it has no immediate influence on an
individual's conduct, what I call disruptive knowledge challenges an
individual's operating assumptions about the world. The challenge
may come in the form of an assault on self-image or an upheaval of
external worldview, essentially a disruption of the individual's
evaluative framework. The religious devotee whose faith is shaken
by scientific revelation, the innocent person who realizes her mother
is part of criminal conspiracy, the taker of a genetic test who
realizes he is prone to disease and now confronts a world in which
he is considerably more vulnerable than he once believed: all are
confronted with disruptive knowledge.
I include in this category the panoply of purely psychological
harms that knowledge can cause. Some people may be happier not
knowing with certainty whether they will develop Huntington's
Disease. Others may wish to avoid an HIV diagnosis because they
are unprepared emotionally to accept the fact of their
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infection-irrespective of any actions the diagnosis would compel
them to take or to avoid.
To the extent that knowledge may cause anxiety or depression,
it may, of course, lead to social disengagement or self-destructive
conduct. Receiving a diagnosis of Huntington's Disease or early
onset Alzheimer's may lead to depression and even suicide. Why,
then, is this kind of knowledge not just an example of provocative
knowledge discussed above?
Disruptive knowledge may well lead to different behaviors than
would have occurred but for the knowledge. But the essential
attribute of both provocative and inhibitory knowledge is that they
thrust an unwanted choice directly upon the holder. Disruptive
knowledge, in contrast, may change one's opinion of life's value and
alter one's imagined tomorrows. It is unwanted because it is painful
to hold, not because a choice it provokes is painful to make. The
anxiety and depression that results from disruptive knowledge may
be so overwhelming that some are driven to self-destructive
behavior, a result of their inability to cope with the knowledge.
Suicide and depression may thus be manifestations of a psyche
smashed by unwelcome knowledge.' 2 3
Ruth Chadwick is the author of an oft-cited essay on the "right
not to know" genetic information, in which she identifies some of the
same rationales for ignorance I have identified in this Article,
including the risk of emotional distress.'2 4 Although knowledge can
help an individual make better choices, it can also lead to a loss of
hope. "Certain kinds of misery," Chadwick writes, "should perhaps
be given special weighting." 2 ' According to Chadwick, the misery
that comes from the loss of hope that would befall a woman who is
informed of the near-certainty of developing premature Alzheimer's
Disease may be just such a case.'2 6 Though, to be sure, some will

23 Some knowledge might be argued to make difficult the choice whether to live or not.

(To be or not to be, that is the question.) The distinction I am trying to draw, and it is not a
perfect one, is between knowledge that is painful to hold, and knowledge that entails a painful
choice. Obviously, many kinds of painful knowledge are of mixed type.
"24Chadwick, supra note 41, at 18.
125 id.
126

id.
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"experience [such]
knowledge as a liberation from the agony of
" 1 27
uncertainty.
Closely related to this interest is the potential injury to what
Chadwick calls "integrity" or the "sense of self."' 28 This harm arises
from intrusion into the private sphere. For example, a woman with
a genetic predisposition to the development of breast cancer "may
have a self-image that is incompatible with this as a possible
future."'2 9 While it may be unrealistic for a woman not to entertain
the idea that she is at least some risk of developing breast cancer,
she may have a self-perception incompatible with the level of risk a
genetic test would disclose. Chadwick asks, appropriately I think,
whether "there [is anything] more to this than the removal of
hope." 3 0
I classify both of these interests together as evaluativeframework harms. Both surely rest at bottom on the same crisis,
the clash between an imagined future and the future new knowledge
presents. Hope, after all, is just an emotional wish for the unfolding
of a future selected from a particular class of futures. Our selfimage, at least our imagined future-self, is also a belief in the
rightness of some futures over others. A belief in the self as having
a positive future and the perdurance of hope are one and the same.
Knowledge hurts when it forces an unwelcome reevaluation of one's
standing in the world.
2. Bad Inference Knowledge. Even if knowledge does not
immediately frustrate an individual's desired choice of conduct and
even if its substance is not disruptive, knowledge may be fraught
with disadvantage simply because it is held and because the fact of
its possession, regardless of its substance, is known by others.
Here, the knowledge holder worries that she will be disadvantaged
by others because of some inference others may draw from the fact
of her knowledge.
The possibility of such ascriptions was at least one reason lenders
opposed the lifting of the prohibition on the voluntary collection of

12
'28
129
'30

Id.
Id. at 19.
Id.
Id. at 20.
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race and other status information by nonmortgage lenders. 1 ' If
they are bound not to collect the information, and do not collect the
information, they cannot be accused either of having used the
information or of intentionally not collecting the information for fear
of what it would show.
Other examples abound. For instance, suppose a stock trader
receives nonpublic information about a company in whose stock he
or she trades. Although the information may not have altered the
trades he or she planned to make, trading after receiving the
information creates an inference that the trade occurred because of
the new knowledge. While trading is not inherently harmful,
trading based on material, nonpublic information arguably is.
Consider an employer who wishes not to hire a job applicant.
Even though the employer may lawfully refuse to hire the applicant
on any number of grounds, he or she may not do so based on the
applicant's race. If the employer does not know the applicant's race,
no claim that race played a role in the hiring decision could be
successful. But if the employer does know the applicant's race,
there is at least some pressure, depending on the circumstances, to
make the hire.'3 2 In all walks of life, people will desire not to receive
information in order to conduct themselves freely, without fear of
accusations that they used the information.
In each of these examples, it is the fact of the holder's possession
of the knowledge, not the substance of the knowledge, that the
holder would like to keep secret. The lender does not care if others
find out that some people denied loans were racial minorities. But
they do not want anyone to find out that they acquired this racial
information. The trader does not care if others learn the substance
of the stock tip but does care if others find out that she knew the
substance of the tip. Consider as well the classic tale of the mafia
witness. He is most concerned whether others, namely the mafia,
will learn the fact of his knowledge, not whether they will find out
the substance of his knowledge, which they presumably already
know.

3
132

See supra notes 99-101 and accompanying text.
Ironically, the employer's decision to change his or her desired conduct to avoid the

harmful inference is a decision made on the basis of his or her knowledge.
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From these examples, it becomes clear that if the consequences
of the bad inference others may draw are sufficiently severe, the
actor may forego the desired conduct to avoid the inference. In this
way, we may conclude that this category is isomorphic to a subset
of the joined categories of provocative and inhibitory knowledge.
After all, the reason one may not want this kind of knowledge is to
retain the freedom to engage or not engage in conduct. The
potential for bad inferences interferes with that freedom.
I include bad inference knowledge as a separate category,
however, because protecting ignorance of this kind of information
may call for different treatment. The person seeking to avoid bad
inference knowledge is seeking to avoid harm that will result only
if others learn of his knowledge and draw inferences concerning his
conduct. He is not troubled by the substance of the information he
receives and would not alter his conduct on the basis of it, but for
the inferences he fears others might draw. Diffusing the anticipated
harm can be accomplished through avoiding the knowledge or
keeping secure the fact of his knowledge.
3. Insecure Knowledge. Finally in the list of interests in
ignorance I will consider comes the risk of insecurity. Here, the
concern is that someone else will receive the substance of the
holder's knowledge and use it, whether purposely or unwittingly, to
harm the holder. Insecure knowledge is knowledge that is prone to
further dissemination, either because it requires the help of others
to discover (who may then have the knowledge themselves and may
disseminate it), because it is discovered by the holder in a way that
makes it possible for others to discover, or because the holder
himself may not be able to resist disseminating it.
A person may desire to remain ignorant to avoid the insecurity
that accompanies knowing. It is harm from third parties the
individual seeks to avoid, not any direct harm caused merely by
holding the insecure knowledge. For example, one might refuse an
HIV test because conducting the test necessarily involves the
participation of other individuals, creating a risk that the
information will be spread to someone in a position to cause direct
harm to the tested individual. Daniel Solove has identified this
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concern over insecurity as a species of privacy interest. 133 He
characterizes the present harm of insecurity as "the injury of being
placed in a weakened state, of being made more vulnerable to a
range of future harms."'3 4
Chadwick also notes insecurity as a reason for ignorance because
by avoiding this knowledge, one may avoid the adverse "social
consequences... of stigmatisation discrimination." 35 However, she
considers these to be "arguments for restricting the access of others
to the knowledge rather than for a right of the individual concerned
not to know." 136 Chadwick is correct that the individual's ultimate
interest is in preventing dissemination, but ignorance can be a
means of achieving this end, just as ignorance is a means of
achieving the ends of maintaining psychological well-being and
avoiding hard choices. 3 v
One might also object that some of the ignorance interests
already discussed are actually security interests. Consider, for
example, the interest in remaining ignorant in order to avoid the
inference that conduct was undertaken on account of the knowledge.
Harm will only result if such an inference occurs, and the inference
will only be reached if the fact of the actor's knowledge becomes
known to others. So, an employer who knows the race of an
applicant and refuses to hire him may only be accused of racism if
others conclude that the employer knew the applicant's race. Thus,
it could be argued, the employer's true interest in remaining
ignorant lies in his fear that others will learn of his knowledge.
Insecure knowledge, however, is knowledge the substance of
which the holder wants to keep from others but worries that she
cannot. Avoiding insecure knowledge is one way that we can help
prevent others from learning the substance of the information that
would give rise to the knowledge. But avoidance is no guarantee
that others will not independently encounter the information, at

133 Daniel J. Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 477, 516-20 (2006).
134 Id. at 519.
'" Chadwick, supra note 41, at 18.

136 id.
137 I consider below whether society ought to place any substantial weight on an
individual's idiosyncratic evaluation of the risk of insecurity and the magnitude of the harm
that may follow dissemination. See infra note 161 and accompanying text.
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which point the very harms feared from acquiring insecure
knowledge might occur.
In contrast, what I call bad inference knowledge is knowledge
that can lead to harm from others if they became aware of the fact
that the holder possesses it. Avoiding bad inference knowledge frees
one to engage in desired courses of conduct without fear that others
will make inferences about how the knowledge was used in the
decision to engage in the conduct. The holder desires ignorance to
preserve his freedom of action, but he is not worried that others will
discover the same substance that he avoided. Indeed, in many
situations true security is impossible. 8'
D. THE HYBRID WORLD

Most individual decisions whether to receive information or not
involve a weighing of various interests, both those in ignorance and
those in knowing. Against the power the knowledge confers must
be set the interests in not knowing discussed above. When
considering a genetic test, one must consider not only its
advantages-in terms of planning, mitigation, and perhaps even
treatment-but also its disadvantages-including the risk of
dissemination to discriminators, the psychological impact of the
results, and the unsavory choices one may face upon receiving the
results. I now turn to how society should view and respond to calls
for assistance in the effort to remain ignorant-how we might sort
through these myriad interests.
IV. COLLECTIVE INTERESTS

Just because a person wishes to remain ignorant does not mean
that law must aid him. Nor does it necessarily mean that law
should override his desire. What then are the circumstances in
which law intervenes? How should it intervene?

" Recall that even the self-test privilege cannot be used to protect evidence concerning
the fact of the lender's knowledge of status characteristics, only the results of the lender's
analysis of the information it gathered. See supranote 103 and accompanying text.
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When we enforce or support an individual's ignorance in order to
give effect to his reasons, we are supporting either his autonomy,
meaning his ability to make independent choices concerning his own
destiny, or his privacy, meaning his interest in maintaining a
private sphere into which the rest of us do not intrude without
permission. 1 39 But a society may also have its own reasons for
supporting ignorance, so that it acts not to respect autonomy or
privacy (even though it objectively might be doing just that) but to
meet other social goals. In between these two poles, society might
act to support an individual's choice for ignorance, not to meet its
own goals but to serve what society deems are the best interests of
the individual, either those an individual would have held after
rational reflection or those the society thinks he should have.
Of course, these are the options confronting society in
determining how much weight to afford any individual interests, not
just ignorance interests. I do not expect ever to read a simple, grand
unified, prescriptive theory of autonomy from which the proper
societal response to every particular situation can be derived.
Whether an elegant theory of everything will ever arrive, it is not
my project here.
Rather, I will briefly discuss several discrete issues raised by the
special problem of unwanted knowledge. First, I will consider how
under different conceptions of autonomy we might analyze the
ignorance interests identified in the last Part. Next, I note an
important difficulty with satisfying actual knowledge
preferences-the tendency of polling to convey information that
would frustrate an ignorance preference. Third, I review several
societal objectives that we might wish to advance instrumentally
through knowledge regulations. Finally, I consider some legal tools
that we might use to protect or attack ignorance interests.

'39

1 am referring here to what Graeme Laurie calls "spatial privacy."

Laurie, supra

note 42, at 27. The distinction Laurie draws is between spatial privacy, "a state ofnonaccess
to the individual's physical body or psychological person," and "informational privacy," an
interest in maintaining control over personal information. Id. Spatial privacy resembles the
privacy interest Solove identifies as that against "intrusion." Solove, supra note 133,
at 552-53. Solove intends to identify with this label our interest in being let alone and in
maintaining voluntary seclusion from both information, like junk mail, and physical and
social intrusions. Id. at 553.
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The shape of knowledge, and its character as nonrivalrous,
nonexclusive, and sticky, results in the appearance of certain
conflicts and considerations that do not appear in allocating movable
goods or real property. We have seen something of this already in
reviewing individual ignorance interests. I will focus on these
characteristics that make knowledge regulation a harder, or at least
different, problem than, for example, real estate regulation. With
this limited scope in mind, let us consider some of the special
problems that knowledge poses for autonomy, instrumentalism, and
regulatory tools.
A. IGNORANCE AND AUTONOMY

1. ExistingApproaches. One reason to prevent the dissemination
to an individual of some information is the individual's own desire
not to receive it. A presumed moral obligation to support individual
autonomy has been used by several authors as the underlying
rationale for recognizing a "right not to know" particular kinds of
information. 4 Some appear to assume effortlessly that, at least as
to certain forms of knowledge, a "right not to know" is fundamental
and worthy of constitutional protection."'4 When considering certain
highly charged information transactions, respect for individual
choice can appear to be such an obviously essential attribute of
freedom or engrained social value that support for autonomypromoting legal rules scarcely seems to need justification.
For example, mandatory HIV testing laws have been decried for
their unconstitutionality, the authors more or less assuming that
such laws burden a fundamental right to privacy.'4 2 Others have
similarly argued that giving a patient a right to refuse genetic
testing, or its results, is justified as vindicating a patient's
autonomy, a "basic bioethical principle."'43 As Andorno explains,
140 See infra notes 143-45 and accompanying text.

See infra note 142 and accompanying text.
See Michael L. Closen, Mandatory Disclosure of HIV Blood Test Results to the
Individuals Tested: A Matter of PersonalChoice Neglected, 22 LOY. U. Ci. L.J. 445, 448
(1991) (contending mandatory disclosure of HIV test results violates "constitutional rights of
liberty and privacy"); Levinson, supra note 56, at 75 (arguing that mandatory HIV testing of
newborns violates women's right to privacy).
141

142

143 Andorno, supra note 43, at 436.
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though such choices are often justified by a rational interest in
remaining free of the psychological harm that might follow from
receiving test results, the right to assess that harm and make a
choice whether to know lies solely with the patient. 1 " Adopting
wholesale Mills's classical definition of autonomy, these authors
argue that freedom of choice should be limited only to the extent
that those choices would harm others.145
Various international agreements and national laws include
explicit protection for patients' rights not to be informed.
Article 10(2) of the European Convention on Human Rights and
Biomedicine states: "Everyone is entitled to know any information
collected about his or her health. However, the wishes of
individuals not to be so informed shall be observed."'" Andorno
notes that this provision embodies a strong pro-autonomy position:
"The Explanatory Report to the Convention justifies the right not to
know by saying that 'patients may have their own reasons for not
wishing to know about certain aspects of their health.' "147
Not all such edicts are as unflinching in their support for
patients' autonomy. For example, the Dutch Code provides that"[ilf
the patient has expressed a wish not to be informed, information
shall not be provided, except where the interest of the patient is
outweighed by the harm to himself or others which may ensue from
withholding it."'" This provision incorporates a "best interests"
limit even on choices that would affect only the individual himself.
Because they operate only within the confines of a contentspecific subset of knowledge choices, these approaches do not offer
a general principle or set of principles to help us decide how much
weight, if any, to give to individuals' own desires (or even the usual
'4

Id. at 436-37.

Id. at 437; Roger Brownsword, An Interest in Human Dignity as the Basis for Genomic
Torts, 42 WASHBURN L.J. 413, 455 (2003).
'46 Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine art. 10(2), Apr. 4, 1997, Europ. T.S.
No. 164. Other conventions and national laws provide for a right not to know. See, e.g.,
Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights, G.C. Res. 16, art. 5(c), U.N.
ESCO, 29th Sess. (Nov. 11, 1997) (protecting rights of individuals to not be informed of
genetic exam results); Andorno, supra note 43, at 436 (describing similar provisions in
French, Dutch, Belgian, and Hungarian health laws).
147 Andorno, supra note 43, at 436 (footnote omitted).
148 CIVIL CODE art. 449 (Neth.), available at http://www.healthlaw.nltwgboeng.html
(emphasis added).
145
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desires rational individuals have) in arbitrary instances in which
knowledge may be unwelcome. Instead, they pick out particular
information-providing situations thought to intrude on individual
freedom or privacy and analyze the competing interests involved in
those situations.
This ad hoc approach has merit. After all, whatever general
principles we might develop we must ultimately return to narrower
applications. If,however, there are some general principles at work,
they could bring a bit more order and rigor to the process of
developing domain-specific legal rules. The goal is to develop
analytical instruments that are both less ad hoc and less blunt, so
that changes in factual context require re-application of the same
set of tools, rather than repeated resort to first principles. 49 With
this in mind, I will proceed to analyze more closely the autonomy
interests at stake in the ignorance interests identified in the prior
Part.
2. Knowledge Affecting Conduct. The interest in avoiding
provocative or inhibitory knowledge lies in avoiding difficult choices,
or in preserving easier ones. An actor who avoids such knowledge
prefers to make an uninformed choice in order to engage in desired
conduct or to avoid undesirable conduct. Knowledge would pressure
him to make a different choice-one he does not wish to make.
Thus, it is natural to view unwanted knowledge of these sorts as
infringements on the holder's autonomy, as it inhibits the actor's
ability to choose conduct that accords with his true, present desire.
Aiding the actor in remaining ignorant, however, is necessarily
consistent only with certain conceptions of the autonomous pursuit
14' For example, the above-cited articles arguing for strong, individual rights to decline
HIV testing depended for much of their force on the fact that even in 1996, HIV was still
viewed as a death sentence (and the prevention of vertical transmission was poorly
understood). See supra note 142 and accompanying text. An HIV diagnosis in 1996 carried
more social consequence than it does today. See Closen, supranote 142, at 462-63 ("Since an
individual infected with HIV may look forward to several years in an asymptomatic state,
many people may prefer several years of good life without the constant torment of knowing
of their sentences of death from HIV infection."); Levinson, supra note 56, at 88-89 (noting
possible medications that might slow onset of AIDS). Of course, today an HIV diagnosis is
still a profound event in the life of an individual, and perhaps the uncommon but merciless
commands of constitutionalism should still have some regulatory role. It is plain, though,
that people may often have serious interests in when and how to obtain information that do
not rise to the level of constitutionally protected rights.
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of well-being, those that involve achieving optimal mental states
and those concerned with actual preference satisfaction.' ° These
theories of autonomy focus on the actor's own preferences and are
unconcerned with any factual, logical, and value-related mistakes
the actor may make in choosing preferences or in making choices
consistent with the chosen preferences.
But autonomy may also be defined by reference to the actor's
ability to satisfy not his actual desires but his "ideal preferences,"
those he would hold if fully informed and deliberative. 5 ' Rules that
tend to promote an actor's ideal preferences paternalistically correct
his mistakes of fact and logic but do not obviate his subjective
evaluations of the worth of various options.'5 2
Remaining ignorant in the face of difficult choices is often not
consistent with a theory of autonomy based on the satisfaction of
ideal preferences. To ignore information that might lead one to
make a different choice is precisely the kind of mistake of fact or
logic that an ideal theory would correct. Thus, only in a regime
committed to actual preference satisfaction would we invariably give
great weight to individuals' interests in remaining ignorant of
provocative or inhibitory knowledge, which of course must compete
with society's own interests.
There are important situations in which the choice to have one's
conduct determined by a consciously limited dataset is perfectly
rational. Most law professors, and many teachers in other
disciplines, are familiar with "blind grading." When grading exams,
we intentionally deprive ourselves of information that would match
exams with names. We do this in part, 5 ' clearly, to serve our

" See Daphna Lewinsohn-Zamir, The Objectivity of Well-Being and the Objectives of
PropertyLaw, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1669, 1675-80 (2003) (describing mental-state theories and
preference theories of well-being).
151 Id. at 1680; see also Aditi Bagchi, DeliberativeAutonomyand LegitimateState Purpose
Under the First Amendment, 68 ALB. L. REV. 815, 817-18 (2005) (explaining concept of
"deliberative autonomy" as interest in being treated "in a manner consistent with their
capacity to think for [one's self]"). There are a range of such theories that require more or
less information and more or less deliberation. Id.
152 The latter is the office of objective theories of value. Lewinsohn-Zamir, supra
note 150,
at 1686.
1
The other, obvious, reason that we grade blind is to avoid students' drawing the
inference that we used their identity to arrive at a grade. This is a form of bad inference
knowledge, which I do not treat separately from these categories, as it is, for autonomy
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interest in avoiding provocative knowledge. If I know which student
wrote the exam I am grading, it might lead me to assign a different
grade than if I did not know that information. If we believe, as most
of us do, that it would be better for grades on exams not to depend
on the identity of the exam taker, then we must conclude that it
would be preferable not to know the identity in the first place. Of
course, we all hope that this is not true, that we could retain
objectivity even with the information. But humble about our
cognitive deficits in this regard, we resort to blind grading.
This is only one of the more familiar of a large number of
examples. Consider the very purpose of the Federal Rules of
Evidence, with its myriad rules that require keeping information
from jurors so "that the truth may be ascertained and proceedings
5 4
justly determined.""
Consider the sailors who accompanied
Odysseus and who dutifully stuffed their ears to avoid hearing the
Sirens' call. Consider Odysseus himself, who tied himself to the
mast so that he could receive information, information that provided
its own pleasure, and yet act as though he had not. 5 '
Where the avoidance of provocative or inhibitory knowledge
represents a conscious effort to avoid cognitive defects-that is, an
effort to enhance the rationality of decision making-we would
expect more ready societal support for ignorance. Where it
represents an effort to avoid making a rational decision, legal
support for the effort might only be justified in those situations in
which actual autonomy is our primary concern. And only the most
"private" decisions, those intimately affecting our sense of self and

purposes, arguably homomorphic to them.
14

FED. R. EVID. 102. Interestingly, one commentator has argued that the goal announced

in this rule is "to position its triers of fact in such a way that they may acquire justified true
belief (JTB), which is traditionally the tripartite criteria of knowledge." Alani Golanski, Why
Legal Scholars Get Daubert Wrong: A Contextualist ExplanationofLaw's Epistemology, 22
WHITTIER L. REV. 653, 654 (2001). This may similarly be the goal of genetic testing in
conjunction with counseling. The test results alone would convey information, but not the
kind of knowledge we collectively think best decodes the information.
15 HOMER, THE ODYSSEY 241 (Rodney Merrill trans., Univ. of Mich. Press 2002). Note
the reproduction here of the dynamic explored above between regulation of conduct and
avoidance of knowledge. See supra notes 86-94 and accompanying text. Avoidance of
knowledge is likely to be the safer route, but regulation of conduct may often be cheaper and
less intrusive.
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having the least potential impact on others, will probably qualify for
such protection.
It is worth noting that the interests in remaining ignorant of
provocative and inhibitory knowledge are not equals for purposes of
autonomy promotion. Provocative knowledge drives its holder to
perform unwanted conduct. Preventing ignorance of provocative
knowledge thus tends to compel the performance of specific conduct.
Inhibitory knowledge, by contrast, will discourage certain conduct.
Laws that compel conduct are often thought to be more
problematic from an autonomy perspective than laws that prevent
conduct. 5 6 In tort law, for example, duties to refrain from conduct
are common, while duties to perform conduct arise only in special
situations, such as where the duty holder is in a special relationship
with the duty beneficiary. And in the criminal law, banning conduct
is common; requiring conduct, absent the voluntary assumption of
a position that creates a duty to act, is virtually unheard of.
For this reason, we should expect laws that operate to encourage
transmission of inhibitory knowledge to be more readily justifiable
than those that encourage transmission of provocative knowledge.' 57
3. Evaluative-Framework Harms and Disruptive Knowledge.
Moving on to evaluative framework harms, it would appear that we
have found an ignorance interest that just about any theory of
autonomy can get behind. Because rational deliberation can end in
the conclusion that the harms from the knowledge will outweigh the
benefits of knowledge, remaining ignorant of evaluative framework
harms can satisfy even an individual's ideal preferences.

" Eric Rakowski, The Sanctity of Human Life, 103 YALE L.J. 2049, 2089 n.102 (1994)
("Political morality and constitutional law typically make coerced action more difficult to
justify than coerced inaction, because requiring somebody to act usually infringes his bodily
autonomy and personal freedom more than does compelling him to refrain from acting. The
government can more easily forbid somebody from selling one of his kidneys than it can
require him to sell one to the state. The government can ban obscene publications even if it
cannot require people to pen edifying verse.").
157 One must be careful in sorting through this distinction, though, as inhibitory
knowledge can be difficult to distinguish from provocative knowledge. For example, HIV
status information is inhibitory knowledge to the extent that it would lead one to refrain from
risky sex. But the same knowledge, as it affects the same conduct, could also be seen as
provocative as it tends to compel the taking of precautions during sex. The line dividing the
two is, obviously, no more defensible than that between commission and omission.
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However, our ability to anticipate the psychological effects of
information is notoriously limited. Carl Schneider argues, with
some evidence, that as individuals we (a) do not really have
preexisting evaluative frameworks for most things, but rather
engage in ad hoc framework construction in the course of making
and justifying a decision, and (b) are exceedingly bad judges of our
enjoyment and distress at future events. 5 8
If this is the case, then we may opt not to leave this calculation
completely to the individual concerned. Perhaps there ought to be
an expanded role for the intermediary to help avoid misjudgments.
Schneider marshals evidence, however, that prompts a dim view of
even the most lavish information-providing procedures to convey
true understanding and an ability to choose rationally.'5 9 Under an
ideal preferences theory, we might still conclude that an individual
is better off without the knowledge. And there may be a host of
reasons besides pure rationality to leave this decision substantially
to the affected individual. Yet, the evidence should cause us to
pause before making conclusory assertions that the individual
himself is best positioned to anticipate the ill effects of knowledge.
Even if an individual has no rational basis for wishing to remain
ignorant, meaning the putative disruptive knowledge would either
turn out not to be disruptive or at least not so disruptive as to wipe
out the benefits of knowing, those favoring Mill's liberty principle
would likely still favor permitting and even aiding in ignorance. 60
For disruptive knowledge, by definition, has no impact on the future
course of conduct of the holder. Knowledge or ignorance-which of
the two is chosen matters only in the mind of the one who might
hold the knowledge. If ignorance harms, at most, only the one who
chooses it, many would argue that the choice is worth protecting.
4. Insecure Knowledge. Consider an individual whose interest in
ignorance is purely one of maintaining the secrecy of the suspect
information. The individual gauges the insecurity risk on the basis
of both the risk he perceives that the information will spread if he

"s Carl E. Schneider, After Autonomy, 41 WAE FOREsT L. REv. 411, 421-24 (2006).
See id. at 418-20 (finding patients had strong feelings concerning treatments they did
not comprehend).
'60 See supranote 145 and accompanying text.
'9
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receives it and the gravity of the harms that will occur if the
information spreads. What justification is there for leaving those
determinations to the affected individual?
Though there is some reason to believe that the individual is well
suited to evaluate the gravity, to him, of the harms that might
result from dissemination, 1 ' it seems purely a matter of context
whether the individual has any competence to judge the level of risk
of dissemination. He certainly does not appreciate the inner
workings of county health departments, adoption offices, or other
information storehouses. On the other hand, the HIV positive
individual is probably better suited to estimating the risk that one
of his partners, if notified that he has been exposed to HIV under a
partner notification program, will deduce the source of the exposure.
While there is a greater justification here than with regards to
other forms of knowledge for making a societal judgment concerning
the risk of harm, it is not absolute. An information-providing
program whose security depends on the personal situations of the
knowledge recipients, whether the strength and porosity of their
social networks, the degree to which the provision of information
will be conspicuous, or the recipients' own abilities to maintain
security, ought to afford some respect to the recipients' own,
subjective security evaluations. And similarly, other factors, such
as the salience of the information within the participants' networks,
point toward taking seriously the recipients' subjective evaluations
of potential harms of information that is accidentally broadcast.
B. THE

PROBLEM

OF

ASCERTAINING

PREFERENCES

BEFORE

DISSEMINATION

If we do strive to promote autonomy with our knowledge laws
and practices, we will often run into a practical problem. A
preference for ignorance is often difficult to measure precisely
because ignorance is dispelled the instant it is pointed out. Without
asking directly, it is impossible to be absolutely certain whether an
individual wants, at a given moment, to learn some piece of
information. But, asking that question itself conveys information,

161

And, as just discussed, there is reason to doubt even that.
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diminishing to at least some degree the ignorance the individual
might have wanted to maintain.'62 Imagine a doctor telling you
that, while treating you, she has become aware of significant
information about your future health but that she needs your
consent to say more. The very act of seeking your consent conveys
some information, though imprecise information, concerning risk.
In this way, those who truly prefer ignorance in such matters may
now find it difficult to resist learning more, despite wishing they
had never known they were at risk to begin with.
If we are committed to respecting an individual's own reasons
either for ignorance or for knowledge, how can we go about
ascertaining their preferences? How do we distinguish those bits of
information an individual would want to know from those he would
not? What questions should we ask, and what evidence should we
consider?
Thankfully, it is sometimes not at all injurious to the individual's
preferences to ask whether he wants to know something. The
lawyer in the mode of client zealot, for example, may genuinely not
wish to know that the client's proposed testimony is false, and that
preference may persist no matter how close we come to revealing to
him information that suggests the testimony's falsity. For it is the
ultimate question on which he wants to remain ignorant, because
only actual knowledge would require him to disclose the information
to the court or to refuse to use the evidence.'63 Mere reasons to
suspect one way or the other might not matter to him at all.
In general, there are a couple of clear answers to the question of
how we go about ascertaining preferences. Bad inference knowledge
and insecure knowledge do not present the preference acquisition
problem. With each, the objection of a potential knowledge recipient
is to what their possession of the knowledge would signal to others,
not to the effect on themselves of the substance of the knowledge.
Thus, polling is only a problem with autonomy-constraining

162

See Dorothy C. Wertz & John C. Fletcher, Privacy and Disclosurein Medical Genetics

Examinedin an Ethics ofCare, 5 BIOETHICS 212, 221 (1991) (noting phenomenon with respect
to Huntington's Disease).
'63 See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PRoF'L CoNDUcT R. 3.3 cmt. 8 (2008) ("[Plrohibition against
offering false evidence only applies if the lawyer knows that the evidence is false. A lawyer's
reasonable belief that evidence is false does not preclude its presentation to the trier of fact.').
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provocative and inhibitory knowledge and with disruptive
knowledge and most obviously with the latter.
With these problematic types, clearly, we could err on the side of
being too revelatory. Faced with the possibility of abrogating
autonomy by revealing too little or abrogating it by revealing too
much, it might make sense to reveal too much. Though doing so
may pose choices the individual wishes to avoid and a risk of
psychological harm, the insult of underinforming is arguably
greater.
The core of autonomy is freedom of choice, and
underinforming interferes directly with that freedom." 4
On the other hand, we might risk erring by overwithholding. To
inform is to pierce a bubble of privacy. We should be sure, the
argument goes, that the individual wants a bit of potentially
explosive information before we assail her with it.
"The
presumption is that individuals' psychological privacy should be
respected unless there is good reason not to do so."'
Neither side of this debate makes absolute claims. We often do
not know for sure that a patient wants to be informed that he has
an arterial blockage that requires a medical or surgical procedure
to treat. We may have no reason to think he does not wish to know
this information, and we think that any rational person in similar
circumstances would want to know. And so, we inform. Similarly,
we already recognize the propriety of a doctor's withholding
information when the physician determines the information would
be harmful to an unstable or depressed patient, especially if there
66
is no effective treatment.
If our aim is to give effect to an individual's actual or ideal
preferences, then we should try to ascertain those preferences
without negating them. It would seem that the "best interests"
approach is suited to making an initial, autonomy-respecting
determination. 167
That is, we should presume first that an
84 See Andorno, supra note 43, at 438 ("[The right not to know cannot be presumed, but
should be 'activated' by the explicit will of the person.").
16 G. Laurie, Commentary, A Response to Andorno, 30 J. MED. ETHICS 439, 440 (2004).
"6
This is the so-called "therapeutic privilege." See TOM L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F.
CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETHICS 84 (5th ed. 2001) (describing therapeutic
privilege as controversial exception to rule of informed consent).
61 Again, I am considering for the moment only those situations in which we have
determined that an individual's own interests can be determinative.
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individual's desires match those any ordinary, rational person would
Under this presumption, nearly all
have in his position.
interactions will be found not to implicate a rational interest in not
knowing.
Once the burden has been placed, either in favor of or, rarely,
against dissemination, particularized evidence concerning an
individual's preferences can sometimes overcome the initial
presumption. Such evidence might come in the form of statements
of which the intermediary is aware or decisions made with respect
to other information.
Note that the task here is much more difficult than in, say, endof-life cases. There, the task of ascertaining individual desires is
made easier because (a) more people anticipate this kind of dilemma
and thus indicate, sometimes even formally, their preferences in
advance, 6 ' and (b) we can more freely delegate the decision to
family members who are likely to be best positioned to know the
patient's true wishes.16 9 So too in cypres cases, if we wish to reform
a charitable trust to match as closely as possible the disposition the
settlor would have reached, there is often at least some indication
from the settlor regarding his or her ultimate intent.
In "right not to know" dilemmas, we will often lack direct
information about what the potential recipient would want and also
will be unable to probe either him or those best positioned to know
his desires. Those who have the sorts of relationships with an
individual that would give them insight into his or her likely
information preferences are exactly the class of individuals that
could not be counted on, and may not even be able or permitted, to
maintain the confidentiality of the information that would be kept
from the individual.
Because the decision making process will be insulated from the
one from whom information is being kept and others who take an

16

Though they may do so quite badly and unreliably. See Schneider, supra note 158,

at 425 (discussing living wills).
16 Or, at least, so the argument goes. It may well be that, precisely because of their
attachments to their loved one, family members often have preferences adverse to those of
the dying patient. It is likely that similar conflicts of interest would arise if family members
were delegated the choice whether their loved ones should be informed of potentially
damaging information.
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interest in her affairs, there is a special danger that an
intermediary administering a "best interests" presumption will
either consciously or unconsciously substitute his own preferences
and interests for both archetypal "reasonable preferences" and the
affected individual's interests. That is, beginning with a bestinterests approach carries the danger that the intermediary's own
preferences and interests will count too much, either because the
intermediary is insulated enough to enable corruption or for purely
innocent reasons. When reflecting on what people generally desire,
we sometimes substitute what we would desire for ourselves,
however idiosyncratic this judgment might be. 7 '
The rise of patient autonomy as a central tenet of medical ethics
represents the adoption of a belief that people's preferences
concerning their treatment can and do vary widely, and that
doctors, while better positioned to predict the consequences of
various treatment options, are inferior to patients themselves in
valuing various outcomes and weighing risks. This assertion can
apply to any intermediary charged with deciding whether to
disseminate information the recipient may not want. While others
may be more expert in interpreting such information, only the
recipient can decide whether he or she is better off with or without
it.
There are circumstances, however, that ought to increase our
confidence in the "best interests followed by evidence" approach. If
the best interests analysis is performed under stable professional
norms, and especially where those norms are publicly revealed and
debated, we can be more confident that such analyses will not

170 The reason being that we are prone to believing that our own decisions are more

representative than they really are. See Lee Ross, David Greene & Pamela House, The 'False
Consensus Effect". An Egocentric Bias in Social Perceptionand Attribution Processes, 13 J.
EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 279, 292-93 (1977) (showing that whether subjects believed
acquiescence was common or uncommon affected their decision making). Interestingly, this
effect was not observed when participants were given some representative information
concerning another's prior decisions and incentives for proper assessment. See Dirk
Engelmann & Martin Strobel, The False Consensus Effect Disappears If Representative
Information and Monetary Incentives Are Given, 3 EXPERIMENTAL ECON. 241, 253 (2000)
(noting that study's results indicate that "the false consensus effect might not be very
relevant for economic applications" but that effect might be real if observer does not have
access to "explicit information without uncertainty" regarding earlier decisions of their

counterpart).
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become proxies for the intermediary's own preferences.
Professionally agreed upon factors and weights are important, as is
the need to document the analysis. For example, in the nascent
genetic testing debate, all seem to agree that the lack of any
treatment for a genetic condition revealed by a test weighs against
disclosing the information to the patient in the absence
of any
171
information.
this
wants
patient
the
that
indication
More generally, where the harms the information might cause
are extremely subjective and where they vary widely in magnitude
among the population, we should be cautious in withholding.
Whatever choice we make in such a context is prone to large error.
C. SOCIETY'S REASONS

Satisfying individual desires cannot be the sole concern of any
society. As a collective, we must be alert even to the gentler ripples
that emanate from the activities of individuals. After all, social
problems emerge not only as the direct conflicts among individuals
but also as unhappy collisions of our society's rules against the sea
of individual actions. Problems concerning knowledge distribution
are no different.
I will not analyze here all social justifications for enforcing
ignorance or mandating knowledge. The concern of this Article is
only with knowledge an individual finds unwelcome. Thus, this
discussion of society's instrumental interests is confined to those
rationales that relate directly to the individual's own interests in
ignorance. Though there may be many of these, I will start by
briefly discussing two: disengagement and harm to others.
1. Disengagement. As with any unwelcome requirement, a
knowledge mandate will be resisted by those who do not want
knowledge. If knowledge is the price of engagement in some social
interaction, there will be some who decide that the price is too high
to justify the burden of the knowledge they fear they might gain.

171 See Andorno, supra note 43, at 435 (noting this information may lead to depression);

Brownsword, supra note 145, at 456 (stating that, in this situation, not telling should be
default position); Laurie, supra note 42, at 50 (recommending no legal redress for a
reasonable decision not to disclose).
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For example, required prenatal HIV tests may drive women away
from prenatal care altogether. 172 So too, one might imagine, would
mandatory genetic tests.7 3 In each, the collective value we place on
testing must be set against the anticipated cost of those who opt out
in order to achieve ignorance. Though we might believe, perhaps
even rightly, that all pregnant women should receive prenatal HIV
tests in order to protect their children, we must be aware that
mandating testing will drive some women from seeking prenatal
care at all. Without even considering the value we place on
satisfying such a woman's own preferences, though we surely must
include that in our balance, we must still evaluate the costs and
benefits that will be incurred when choosing between a mandate,
with its prenatal opt-outs, and no mandate, with its testing opt-outs.
2. Harm to Others. Chadwick points to another reason society
may choose dissemination where an individual would choose
ignorance.' 7 4 Set against the individual's self-interest in ignorance
is the individual's duty of solidarity. Where the knowledge one
could gain would have consequences for others, choosing not to know
may have the effect of hiding the information from such others,
depriving them of a choice whether to know or not to know. v5
What Chadwick calls a duty of "solidarity," that sometimes may
compel learning in order to alert others, is at bottom a duty to aid
others. When there should be such a duty to help others is a
question well known in tort law. There is, generally, no duty to
rescue, absent a special relationship between the victim and the
would-be rescuer.1 76
Chadwick discusses a possible duty of
solidarity with respect to the group of one's genetic peers, those with
whom one shares relevant genetic similarities. Most often this will

172 See Erin Nicholson, MandatoryHIV Testing of PregnantWomen: Public HealthPolicy

Considerationsand Alternatives,9 DuKE J. GENDER L. & POLY 175, 183-84 (2002) ("There is
reason to believe that the women for whom prenatal care and the HIV test are most
important, may be the very women who do not come in for care if they know it is predicated
by an HIV test.").
...See Andrews, supra note 36, at 984-85 ("The fear of undergoing involuntary genetic
testing may deter women from seeking medical care during pregnancy. . .
174 Chadwick, supra note 41, at 20.
175 Id.
176 See 57A AM. JUR. 2D Negligence § 81 (2004) (stating general rule that there is no
common-law duty to rescue, but that duty may arise from some special relationship).
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be one's own family members. 77 Does mere membership in a
give rise to a special relationship
grouping of the genetically similar
178
triggering a duty to rescue?

Duty to others is, in different contexts, a rather uncontroversial
reason to force knowledge, regardless of the idiosyncratic desires of
the subject. This duty is easiest to see and to support when the
subject has placed himself in a position in which others are
dependent on his knowledge. For example, trivially, passengers on
a plane have the support of society in demanding that their pilot be
forced to know the details of landing procedures at their destination
airport, no matter the pilot's irrational desire to live dangerously.
Agreeing to know such things is implicit in becoming a pilot.
Though an individual's view of his role may differ from that society
takes, when that role is heavily regulated to prevent harm, that is
when the role presents substantial public welfare concerns, we often
dictate duties to know and to learn certain information. Somewhat
less trivially, engaging in sexual activity with another may also
justify imposing a duty to know rather than to remain ignorant.
There is, quite obviously, a relationship, however fleeting, and each
partner is dependent on the other to acquire information concerning
the risks posed by sex.
Let us return to our lawyer who astutely avoids learning
information that may reveal crucial evidence to be false. Ellman
gives several reasons why we should not permit lawyers to hide
from the truth in criminal cases, even when they believe it would
help their clients. 179 First, he is skeptical concerning the abilities of
most clients and lawyers "to ensure that the lawyer learns what she
must but does not hear what she would rather not." 8 ° Secondly,
whether it concerns an individual lawyer or not, avoiding the truth
may become a staple of the lawyer-client relationship, blossoming
beyond the bounds the lawyer anticipated.'' Finally, Ellman notes
that the lawyer as truth-avoider is inconsistent with the role society
177 Chadwick, supra note 41, at 14-16.
178 See supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text. For example, does Susan's sister have

a valid claim that Susan has a duty to be tested?
179

Ellman, supra note 111, at 905-06.

'80

Id. at 905.

181

Id.
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has defined for lawyers in our legal system; while we do not demand
that they serve as neutral assistants in inquisition, neither are they
instruments for the advancement of false claims." 2
The first two of these reasons appear to be consistent with an
ideal preferences, autonomy approach. The lawyer who hides from
the truth is surely interested in advancing his client's interests to
the extent possible, but, in general, we are skeptical that by
avoiding knowledge the lawyer is in fact fulfilling his own end. The
third, however, asserts simply that we do not want lawyers to
engage in this conduct because that is not how we have defined
lawyering. The lawyer's ignorance is a threat to a system in which
the lawyer plays a role, and so his preference for ignorance may be
displaced by the broader social value.
D. REGULATORY TOOLS

Legal options to negate or support an interest in not knowing are
not difficult to compile. In general, we might look for tools that
mandate or prohibit knowledge transfers or that alter the incentives
for knowledge acquisition of avoidance. Each of these could target
potential knowledge recipients or intermediaries.
1. Focus on Intermediaries. Law already regulates many
important knowledge intermediaries, like doctors. Informed consent
laws require health care providers to convey information about
treatment to patients in hopes that patients will then have the
knowledge necessary to make decisions that accord with their true
preferences.' 83 When there is reason to think an individual would
prefer to remain ignorant of some of this information, we could,
through law, ignore this preference and continue to enforce the duty
to convey all relevant information. We could, alternatively,
absolutely forbid the conveyance of suspect information. But it is
also possible that law could delegate to the caregiver this highly

182 See id. at 906 ("[W~e as a society do not have lawyers in order to enable people to
prevail on false claims.").

183 See RUTH R. FADEN & TOM L. BEAuCHAMP, A HISTORY AND THEORY OF INFORMED

CONSENT 25-26 (1986) (noting that failure to obtain informed consent constitutes tort
grounded in right of self-determination and physician's fiduciary duty to his or her patient).
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sensitive decision. This discretion could be absolute or held to some
legal or professional standard.
With respect to third party disclosure of suspect information, the
law could force disclosure, forbid disclosure, or leave disclosure
within the third party's discretion. It is important, though, to keep
in mind that the regulatory choice we make will affect more than
the information exchanges between intermediary and client. It is
not possible to affect one aspect of most such relationships without
simultaneously affecting other aspects. Mandating or encouraging
dissemination of unwanted knowledge will discourage some from
interacting with knowledge intermediaries at all.8 4
2. Focus on Potential Holders. Of course, another regulatory
target is the individual who wants to avoid knowledge. Law can
forbid anyone from transferring the suspect information to him,
perhaps through tort law. 8 5 Law might require the individual to
learn the information, despite his wishes. 8 ' Law may play no role
at all. We might also create incentives for knowledge (or remove
incentives for ignorance) in the form of (a) rules that create liability
for conduct that knowledge would have prevented or (b) rules that
abrogate the advantages of ignorance (willful blindness).
a. Shifting IgnoranceRisk Through Liability. An autonomyrespecting and yet social utility enhancing option is to permit the
knowledge avoider to remain ignorant if he chooses, despite the risk
of some harm that might be averted by knowledge, but make the
avoider liable for the injuries the knowledge could have averted.
Whenever law makes one liable based on what one "should have
known," it abrogates individuals' interests in not knowing. If a lead
paint statute makes it illegal to fail to disclose the existence of lead
paint when an owner knows or should know about it, the statute
interferes with a seller's interest in remaining ignorant. The force
of that interference varies with the extent of liability imposed.
The effect of such rules is to place the risk of ignorance on the
actor who fails to become informed. So our homeowner is not forced,

18
185
186

See supra notes 172-73 and accompanying text.
See Brownsword, supra note 145, at 455-62 (arguing for tort duty not to inform).
For example, to enforce a duty to others or a duty created by the individual's chosen
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by law, to test his home for lead, but when he remains ignorant he
assumes the risk of paying for injuries that result from any lead
that is there. If the law requires full compensation for such injuries,
then a "should have known" rule will almost certainly 187
compel
knowledge, as lead paint injuries can be severe and costly.

HIV testing provides another interesting example. In many
jurisdictions it is criminal to have unsafe sex knowing that one is
infected with HIV.88 Acting with a purpose to spread the virus is
generally not required. Such statutes do not, either directly or
indirectly, require an individual to obtain an HIV test. In fact, they
provide precisely the opposite incentive, at least for those who wish
to engage in risky sex.
But one can certainly imagine statutes that create liability, civil
or criminal, for engaging in activity that has some nontrivial
likelihood of transmitting the virus when one knows or should know
that he is infected.' 89 Under this regime, the incentive is at least
partially reversed. Individuals must internalize the risk of
enforcement before engaging in the risky conduct, having declined
to be tested. Here (some of) the cost of ignorance is shifted to the
actor, the lesser of the expectation of enforcement or foregoing
desired conduct.
Going further, consider a statute focused on preventing the
spread of a dangerous pathogen that is more casually transmitted
than HIV. A statute similar to the hypothetical one just considered
might make everyday conduct, maybe even riding a subway or going
to a movie, illegal when performed by those who should be aware
that they are infected. Again the costs of ignorance are placed on

187 See generally Chris A. Milne & Robert K Rainer, Milne Law Offices:

Lead Paint

Litigation-Challenges in the 1990s, httpJ/www.childtrust.com/pages/articleschallenge.html
(last visited Sept. 22, 2008) (providing summary of 1990s lead paint litigation).
188 See generally State Statutes, supra note 71 (noting, e.g., section 5-14-123 of the
Arkansas Code (criminalizing sex with uninformed partner by one who knows he or she is
HIV positive)).
189 Alabama, at least, has a statute that might encompass such a duty: "Any person
afflicted with a sexually transmitted disease who shall knowingly transmit, or assume the risk
of transmitting,or do any act which will probably or likely transmitsuch disease to another
person shall be guilty of a Class C misdemeanor." ALA. CODE § 22-11A-21 (West, Westlaw
through 2008 Sess.) (emphasis added).
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the actor, but the costs come in the form of (a) the expectation of
enforcement or (b) the cost of disengaging from everyday activities.
So, we see that in general, laws that create either negligence-type
or strict liability shift the risk of ignorance to the actor, in effect
promoting rational autonomy while protecting the interests of
others. The actor must now weigh the total costs to him of becoming
informed against the total costs of ignorance, generally the lesser of
the expectation of enforcement and the cost of not performing the
conduct for which the actor could be liable.
b. Abrogatingthe Benefits of Ignorance. There are, to be sure,
situations in which we want people to choose information over
ignorance, if they are aware of the risk their conduct might create.
But, we may nonetheless not want to sweep up all negligent
ignorances by imposing strict liability. Nor do we want to impose
knowledge mandates.
Making this distinction is the office of the "willful blindness"
90
doctrine, sometimes called the "conscious avoidance" doctrine.
When avoiding the knowledge that would make an actor liable for
his conduct is a conscious objective of the actor, liability that would
ordinary require a defendant's knowledge is established despite the
actor's ignorance. The willful blindness doctrine prevents an
explicit calculation by the actor of the costs of being informed but
permits other kinds of negligence without incurring liability. In
short, it prevents one whose conduct would be criminal (or tortious)
with the requisite mens rea from burying his head in the sand.19'
V. CONCLUSION

This Article is a step toward a fuller exploration of the problem
of knowledge. This problem is broader than dealing with that
subset of knowledge individuals themselves do not wish to have.
Though we hear cries that information wants to be free and that
more knowledge is better, that knowledge is power, I have shown
190 See, e.g., In re Aimster Copyright Litigation, 334 F.3d 643,650 (7th Cir. 2003) (finding
that "willful blindness" is knowledge in copyright law).
191 Seegenerally Jessica A. Kozlov-Davis, Note,A HybridApproachto the Use ofDeliberate

Ignorancein ConspiracyCases, 100 MICH. L. REv. 473 (2001) (examining deliberate ignorance
in conspiracies).
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already that there are types of knowledge that we, ourselves, believe
we are better off without.
But even knowledge individuals desire may, if acquired, be
socially ruinous. A growing chorus of futurists, scientists, and other
scholars is warning of the dangers of new forms of knowledge.
Much of the focus of this modern disquiet is on potentially
destructive (or disruptive) technologies, such as genetically
engineered viruses and nanotechnology. Many worry that our
rapidly expanding knowledge will make more and more destructive
power available to an ever greater number of smaller and smaller
groups. Indeed, it is a fortuitous accident of geology and physics
that the production of atomic weapons requires a level of
organization and commitment of resources typically mustered only
by advanced nation states. But there is no guarantee that new,
equally destructive technologies will be as taxing to master and to
deploy. Rather, it is virtually guaranteed that some will not be.
The voices pressing for regulation are hardly revolutionary. For
nearly as long as we humans have conveyed to one another the sort
of persistent knowledge that can form the basis for action, factions
of us have agitated against knowledge acquisition, or for regulation
of knowledge, on religious, social, and scientific grounds. These
groups have in common an argument that collective action is
required to avert particular harms likely to flow from particular
distributions of knowledge-whether these harms be to the broader
group or to the knowledge recipient himself.
Through law, we regulate corporate disclosure and insider
trading, disclosures relating to home purchases, private
information, official government information, information relating
to national security, and much more. Through social and other
private controls, we mediate the acceptance of information conveyed
by scientists and political pundits; we form groups devoted to
fostering knowledge and groups devoted to resisting certain forms
of knowledge; and we spend resources to keep information private
and to discover information about others and the world.
The social and legal structure of modern knowledge regulation is
complex and diverse. It comprises the collection of tools by which
we collectively achieve distributions of knowledge that we deem
right or desirable and avoids distributions we dislike. It is in this
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sense that we can understand knowledge as a kind of property, by
which I mean only the following. First, knowledge, though
influenced in distribution and magnitude by law, exists without
reference to law, like traditional forms of property. Though law may
influence its creation and provide it protection, knowledge requires
no set of laws to exist. Second, in any given bit of knowledge an
individual may be granted some congress of potentially transferable
interests. (It is hardly novel to suggest that at least some kinds of
knowledge are a form of "property." The entire field of intellectual
property is premised on it.) Like other branches of property law, the
law of knowledge is a loose collection of approaches with contextsensitive application, rather than a coherent, comprehensive branch
of law, like tort or contract.
Knowledge, though, is distinct in important respects from most
other resources that are subjected to various of the property law
doctrines. First, it is not naturally exclusive-meaning that more
than one person can know the same thing at once. It is also
nonrivalrous, meaning that one's knowledge is not diminished by
another's possession of the same knowledge. 192 Third, it is
transferred imperfectly via information. For this reason, the "law
of knowledge," though concerned ultimately with regulating the
distribution of knowledge in society, has as its subject information.
Fourth, knowledge is deeply connected with the very idea of
conscience. To regulate what someone is permitted to know is to
regulate who they are. It is no surprise, with knowledge itself a
quality lying at the intersection of property and conscience, that
knowledge regulation is often a focal point of fights between those
advocating individual freedom and those arguing for any number of
conceptions of the collective good, national security, or individual,
"spatial" privacy.
Finally, knowledge is sticky.
It cannot be intentionally
abandoned, only forgotten accidentally. Only avoiding exposure to

19 An important caveat: what one can do with knowledge may well be hampered by the
ability of others to do the same thing based on the same knowledge. So while my knowledge
of a secret formula is not diminished by another's simultaneous knowledge of the formula, my
ability to capitalize on the knowledge may well be. Thus, the property, as a store of value is
rivalrous in the sense that only one instance of the knowledge can be used to realize that
value.
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information that one is able to decode will ensure that ignorance is
maintained.
It is from this perspective and with these characteristics in mind
that I have attempted to identify an individual's own interests in
ignorance and the force of these interests. From interference with
choice to disruption of psyche to maintenance of plausible
deniability, sometimes we are truly better off as individuals not
knowing things-that much is easy to say. The hard problem is to
decide when we are better off as a society when our people choose
ignorance.

